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S A N D R A  G .  M A Y S O N  
Dangerous Defendants 
abstract.  Bail reform is gaining momentum nationwide. Reformers aspire to untether pre-
trial detention from wealth (the ability to post money bail) and condition it instead on statistical 
risk, particularly the risk that a defendant will commit crime if he remains at liberty pending trial. 
The bail reform movement holds tremendous promise, but it also forces the criminal justice system 
to confront a diﬃcult question: what statistical risk that a person will commit future crime justiﬁes 
short-term detention—if any does? What about lesser restraints on liberty, like GPS monitoring? 
Although the turn to actuarial risk assessment in the pretrial context has raised concern in some 
quarters, the debate so far has largely ignored this foundational question. 
 One way of thinking about what level of crime risk justiﬁes restraint is to ask whether the 
answer is diﬀerent for defendants than for anyone else. It is generally assumed that defendants are 
a special case, exempt by virtue of pending charges from otherwise applicable protections against 
preventive interference. This Article challenges that assumption. It argues that, for purposes of 
restraint for general dangerousness, there is no clear constitutional, moral, or practical basis for 
distinguishing defendants from non-defendants who are equally dangerous. There is thus no basis 
to conclude that the risk standard for such restraint should be diﬀerent for defendants than for 
anyone else. 
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introduction 
There is a nationwide movement underway to radically reconﬁgure the pre-
trial system.1 The current system, which relies on money bail as the primary 
mechanism for pretrial release, results in the systematic detention of poor de-
fendants. The scale of detention is vast. Approximately eleven million people are 
arrested each year; on any given day, around half a million of them sit in jail, 
awaiting trial.2 Nearly all pretrial detainees have money bail set and would be 
released if they posted it.3 Even at the lowest bail amounts, detention rates are 
high.4 Reformers from across the political spectrum agree that a system that con-
ditions liberty on wealth is both unjust and ineﬃcient. At least ten states and 
forty counties have accordingly revised, or are in the process of revising, their 
pretrial law and policy—and in some cases their state constitutions.5 If the pace 
of reform continues, the pretrial process across the nation will soon look very 
diﬀerent. 
The core reform goal is to untether pretrial detention from wealth and tie it 
directly to risk. To accomplish that objective, a growing number of jurisdictions 
 
1. See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. 
2. Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (June 2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [http://perma.cc/TJ69-EYN7]. 
3. Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 - Statistical Tables, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT. 1, 15 (Dec. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5EJA-XGNQ] (reporting that nine out of ten detained felony defendants had bail 
set). 
4. Recent studies report that misdemeanor pretrial detention rates in several large cities range 
from twenty-ﬁve to more than ﬁ�y percent. Mary T. Phillips, Pretrial Detention and Case Out-
comes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY (2007), http://www.nycja 
.org/lwdcms/doc-view.php?module=reports&module_id=669&doc_name=doc [http:// 
perma.cc/HL2K-ZLLM] (reporting that twenty-ﬁve percent of misdemeanor defendants are 
detained pretrial in New York City); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The 
Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 733, 736 tbl.1 
(2017) (reporting that ﬁ�y-three percent of Houston misdemeanor defendants were detained 
pretrial from 2008 to 2013); Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at 
Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1525 n.81 (2013) (reporting that twenty-ﬁve percent of 
New York City misdemeanor defendants and ﬁ�y percent of Baltimore misdemeanor defend-
ants are held on bail); Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability To Pay Bail 
Aﬀects Case Outcomes 12 (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author) (re-
porting that, between 2006 and 2013, forty percent of defendants with bail set at ﬁve hundred 
dollars or less were detained in Philadelphia); see also id. at 11 (noting that twenty-eight per-
cent of detained defendants only had misdemeanor charges). 
5. See infra notes 83-122 and accompanying text. 
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are adopting actuarial risk-assessment tools to sort high-risk from low-risk de-
fendants.6 Until now, courts charged with setting bail and making pretrial cus-
tody decisions have, for the most part, assessed risk subjectively. Actuarial risk 
assessment is intended to improve the accuracy and consistency of these judg-
ments. 
It is hard to overstate the momentum behind this shi�. A broad array of 
stakeholders, including national policy groups and large foundations, have ad-
vocated the adoption of pretrial risk assessment tools. The Laura and John Ar-
nold Foundation, for instance, aims to ensure “that every judge in America will 
use a data-driven, objective risk assessment [for pretrial custody determina-
tions] within the next ﬁve years.”7 It may succeed. Jurisdictions around the coun-
try are increasingly turning to risk assessment as the keystone of pretrial reform.8 
The risk of core concern in today’s pretrial policy debate is not, as it once 
was, the risk that defendants might abscond or tamper with witnesses. It is, in-
stead, the risk that released defendants will commit other crimes. Reform oppo-
nents allege that defendants are too dangerous to be released into the community 
without signiﬁcant restraint. The claim is not that they will skip court, harm 
witnesses, or otherwise obstruct prosecution. It is simply that they will commit 
new crimes unrelated to their pending charge.9 In response, reformers assure 
stakeholders that actuarial risk assessment can reduce detention rates without 
compromising public safety. 
There are many explanations for the reform movement’s focus on danger. At 
a structural level, it reﬂects the broader turn toward incapacitation in criminal 
 
6. See infra notes 83-122 and accompanying text. 
7. Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. 5 
(Nov. 2013) [hereina�er LJAF, Developing a National Model], http://www.arnoldfoundation 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/64WV-EXQE]. 
8. See infra notes 93-94 and 121. 
9. See, e.g., The Dangers of Bail Reform Across the U.S., U.S. BAIL REFORM NEWS, http://www 
.usbailreform.com/in-the-news [http://perma.cc/44SV-6EEC]; Have Bail Reforms Made Us 
Safer? Two Views, DAILY REC. (June 18, 2017), http://www.dailyrecord.com/story 
/opinion/2017/06/18/bail-reform-new-jersey/102990434 [http://perma.cc/QR67-66ZZ]. 
Opponents of bail reform are supporting a lawsuit recently ﬁled by the mother of a murder 
victim against Chris Christie, alleging that New Jersey’s bail reform is responsible for her son’s 
killing by a defendant on pretrial release. See, e.g., Ariel Scotti, Dog the Bounty Hunter Joins Bail 
Reform Lawsuit against Chris Christie, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www 
.nydailynews.com/news/national/dog-bounty-hunter-joins-bail-lawsuit-chris-christie 
-article-1.3374458 [http://perma.cc/3PEB-UL7Y]; Christine Stuart, Murder Victim’s Mother 
Sues Chris Christie Over NJ Bail Reform, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 1, 2017), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/murder-victims-mother-sues-chris-christie-nj-bail 
-reform [http://perma.cc/37Y4-BRDX]. 
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justice at the end of the twentieth century, and the risk-oriented, managerial ap-
proach to crime and punishment that Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon 
dubbed “the new penology.”10 As a practical matter, ﬂight risk may be less of a 
concern than it once was because it is hard to truly ﬂee from justice in today’s 
hyper-connected world. And in realpolitik terms, elected judges suﬀer much 
greater political costs when released defendants commit high-proﬁle crimes than 
when they fail to show up for court. 
Whatever the reasons, “[t]he goal of most criminal justice decisionmakers is 
to detain defendants who pose a risk to public safety—particularly those who 
appear likely to commit crimes of violence—and to release those who do not.”11 
This is not to say that ﬂight risk is unimportant, just that public safety has dom-
inated the recent reform conversation.12 In broad strokes, the central goal of the 
bail reform model has been to reduce pretrial detention by limiting it to the sta-
tistically dangerous. 
This model holds great promise, but also raises an extremely diﬃcult ques-
tion: what probability that a person will commit unspeciﬁed future crime justi-
ﬁes detention, or even lesser restraints, like GPS monitoring?13 For defendants 
who score in the top risk bracket on the Federal Pretrial Risk Assessment Instru-
ment (PTRA), for example, the projected likelihood of rearrest for any type of 
crime in the pretrial period is ten percent.14 Defendants classiﬁed as high risk by 
 
10. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452, 455 (1992). 
11. LJAF, Developing a National Model, supra note 7, at 1; see also Shima Baradaran & Frank L. 
McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 547 (2012) (concluding on the basis of an 
empirical study “that judges are basing their [pretrial] decisions far more on predicted vio-
lence than on predicted ﬂight”). The contemporary emphasis on danger is also reﬂected in 
the name of what has rapidly become the most prominent pretrial risk assessment tool: the 
Public Safety Assessment (PSA). See Public Safety Assessment, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., 
www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention/public-safety 
-assessment [http://perma.cc/NAF4-DRYK]. 
12. For recent discussions of ﬂight risk, see Lauryn P. Gouldin, Deﬁning Flight Risk, U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 837 (2016) [hereina�er Gouldin, Disentangling]; and Samuel R. Wiseman, 
Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1351 (2014). 
13. Is it better that ten men who will commit future crime go free than one who would otherwise 
commit no crime be detained, or the reverse? Blackstone himself endorsed much greater over-
inclusiveness in preventive restraint than in punishment, but did not oﬀer a precise ratio. See 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *252-56. 
14. Federal Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (PTRA), Version 2.0 (Mar. 1, 2010) [hereina�er  
Federal PTRA], http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Federal%20Pretrial
%20Risk%20Assessment%20Instrument%20(2010).pdf [http://perma.cc/PT9S-LS6K]. 
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the Florida Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (FL PRAI) have a sixteen per-
cent chance of rearrest in a six-month span.15 And those classiﬁed as high risk 
for violence by the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), the most widely used tool 
in state systems, have about an eight percent chance of rearrest on a violent 
charge within six months.16 Are these probabilities suﬃcient to justify deten-
tion? If not, what probability of future arrest is enough? 
The question has received markedly little attention from modern reformers. 
A generation ago, pretrial restraint to prevent non-case-related future crime—
what I will call, for simplicity, “preventive restraint”—was a matter of intense 
controversy. Critics argued that no probability of future crime was suﬃcient to 
authorize preventive detention.17 Today’s bail reform movement, by contrast, 
has assumed the legitimacy of pretrial preventive restraint and advocates preven-
tive detention as a basic component of a model pretrial system. Advocacy groups 
like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have sporadically voiced con-
cerns but have nonetheless signed on to the reform agenda.18 Among academics, 
the turn to actuarial risk assessment has engendered both excitement and appre-
hension, but criticism has centered on its potential to exacerbate race and class 
 
The instrument does not specify the average length of the pretrial period in the dataset from 
which it was developed. 
15. James Austin et al., Florida Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument, JFA INST. 4, 11, 13, http://www
.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/FL%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20Report
%20(2012).pdf [http://perma.cc/BW42-XC9E]. 
16. Results from the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment – Court in Kentucky, LAURA & 
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. 3 (July 1, 2014) [hereina�er LJAF, Results], http://www 
.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky-6-Month 
-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/S8GJ-ZKZ2]. 
17. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Bail Reform Rules Must Uphold the Aims of Criminal Justice 
Reform, ACLU-NJ and Other Groups Tell NJ Supreme Court (June 3, 2016), http://www
.aclu.org/news/bail-reform-rules-must-uphold-aims-criminal-justice-reform-aclu-nj-other
-groups-tell-nj-supreme [http://perma.cc/6LKD-AHPE] (expressing concern about dra� 
bail reform rules); Bail System Reform, ACLU N.J., http://www.aclu-nj.org/legislation/bail 
-system-reform1 [http://perma.cc/UR65-64CD] (opining that “[a] system based on actual 
risk to the community—not ability to pay—better protects public safety, reduces jail over-
crowding, keeps families together, and saves taxpayer resources”); Job Announcement, 
ACLU, Staﬀ Attorney – Bail Reform [CLRP-25], ACLUF, Trone Center for Justice and Equal-
ity, New York (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.aclu.org/careers/staﬀ-attorney-bail-reform-clrp 
-25-acluf-trone-center-justice-and-equality-new-york [http://perma.cc/KS2V-BVRB] (ex-
plaining that the national ACLU is seeking a staﬀ attorney to “develop, pursue, and conduct 
litigation aimed at bail reform in America”). 
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inequalities.19 There has been essentially no public debate about what degree of 
risk should be deemed suﬃcient to justify detention or other forms of restraint. 
Recent events may soon bring that question to the fore. On January 1, 2017, 
New Jersey’s comprehensive bail reform took eﬀect, including a preventive de-
tention regime that required an amendment to the state constitution. As cases 
move through the new system, New Jersey’s courts are beginning to grapple with 
what quantum of risk is suﬃcient to justify detention.20 Other states pursuing 
reform are not far behind.21 
The adoption of risk assessment will require stakeholders to consider what 
degree of risk justiﬁes restraint, moreover, because the new statistical methodol-
ogy makes the question unavoidable in a way that it was not before. Many of the 
scholars who debated preventive detention a generation ago argued that useful 
prediction was impossible.22 Laurence Tribe diagnosed an early preventive de-
tention proposal as betraying “the inability to predict with even the slightest 
 
19. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017); Melissa 
Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
231, 256-61 (2015); Anne Milgram et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and 
Fairness in Pretrial Decision Making, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216, 220 (2015); Julia Angwin et al., 
Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), http://www.propublica.org/article/machine 
-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [http://perma.cc/FB8E-WSV2]; see also BER-
NARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN AC-
TUARIAL AGE (2007) [hereina�er HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION] (arguing against predic-
tive law enforcement); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk 
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the 
Scientiﬁc Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 803 (2014) (critiquing actu-
arial recidivism risk prediction instruments as “an explicit embrace of otherwise-condemned 
discrimination”); Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 RE-
FORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21, 34-39 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); 
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out: Criminal Justice Risk Assessment and the Myth of Race 
Neutrality (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author). 
20. See infra note 121. 
21. See infra note 122. By contrast, in New York, stakeholders continue to resist pretrial restraint 
for dangerousness entirely, galvanizing debate. See, e.g., Tina Luongo & Cherise Fanno Bur-
deen, Letters to the Editor, Setting Bail and Assessing Risk to Public Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.  
3, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/setting-bail-and-assessing-risk-to 
-public-safety.html [http://perma.cc/74LS-43CN]. 
22. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitch-
ell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 378 (1970) (“To the limited extent that medical science furnishes tech-
niques capable of objectively ascertaining the presence of dangerously incapacitating ill-
ness, . . . neither a comparable body of knowledge nor a comparable technology of prediction 
is yet available for dealing with criminal behavior generally.”). But see Note, Preventive Deten-
tion Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506-07 (1966) (concluding that “given the current 
state of behavioral prediction,” judges’ discretion to detain should be restricted but not neces-
sarily removed). 
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conﬁdence” which defendants would commit future crime because, for lack of a 
better methodology, it relied on broad oﬀense and criminal history categories as 
proxies for dangerousness.23 Today’s actuarial tools are far from perfect, but they 
are rapidly improving in sophistication and predictive power. By making it pos-
sible to formulate more precise legal standards for dangerousness, they also 
make it necessary to do so: the design of every risk assessment tool requires a 
decision about the statistical “cut point” at which a person will be deemed high 
risk, and detention recommended.24 New Jersey’s new regime authorizes deten-
tion on the basis of this recommendation alone,25 which is to say, on the basis of 
a certain probability of rearrest in a six-month period.26 In these circumstances, 
the choice of a statistical risk threshold may be implicit or explicit, but it cannot 
be avoided. 
One way to start thinking about what level of risk justiﬁes restraint is to ask 
a related question: is the answer diﬀerent for defendants than for people not accused 
of any crime? A thought experiment will clarify this approach. Imagine that State 
Z implements actuarial risk assessment at the Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV). Like the newest pretrial risk assessment tools, the DMV tool requires 
no interview. It simply draws on administrative data, primarily criminal history 
records, to identify people who have at least a sixteen percent chance of arrest in 
the next six months. State Z proposes to funnel these DMV visitors into short-
term detention. Presumably, State Z’s proposal would face serious opposition. 
Detention of DMV visitors solely on the basis of this statistical risk would likely 
violate commonly held moral commitments and constitutional norms.27 
 
23. Tribe, supra note 22, at 382. 
24. See Eaglin, supra note 19, at 87-88 (describing the algorithm design process). 
25. See State v. C.W., 156 A.3d 1088, 1099-1100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:162-23(a)(2) (West 2017); N.J. Court Rule 3:4A(b)(5)). 
26. Until a New Jersey-speciﬁc validation study is performed, we do not know exactly what that 
probability is, but if the premise of the PSA is correct—that it functions with comparable ac-
curacy across jurisdictions—then a high-risk classiﬁcation in New Jersey should approxi-
mately correspond to the risk it was shown to represent in the only published evaluation: a 
23% chance of rearrest for anything in a six-month time span, or, for those ﬂagged as high 
risk for violence, an 8.6% chance of rearrest on a violent charge. LJAF, Results, supra note 16, 
at 3. 
27. The Chicago police department has perhaps come closest to this scenario by keeping a highly 
controversial “heat list” of high-risk individuals for special surveillance, threats, and incen-
tives. See Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, but 
Is It Racist?, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854 
[http://perma.cc/T678-AA68]. 
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Now consider whether there is any reason why State Z would nonetheless be 
justiﬁed in detaining defendants who pose the same degree of risk.28 If so, it 
cannot be because that risk alone justiﬁes detention, since it does not justify jail-
ing DMV visitors. The question is whether there is some additional justiﬁcation 
for the restraint of equally dangerous defendants. 
The Supreme Court’s lone decision on pretrial preventive restraint, United 
States v. Salerno,29 does not answer this question. Salerno addressed a facial con-
stitutional challenge to the federal preventive detention regime implemented by 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Court rejected the challenge, holding that no 
constitutional provision categorically prohibits pretrial detention on the basis of 
dangerousness alone. Such detention, it held, can pass constitutional muster un-
der some circumstances. But the Salerno Court did not specify what degree of 
risk is constitutionally suﬃcient to justify detention. And it said nothing about 
whether the answer is diﬀerent for defendants than for others. 
Nor has past scholarship confronted this question head on. There was a dy-
namic debate about the constitutionality of pretrial preventive detention in the 
1970s and 1980s, when Congress enacted the ﬁrst preventive detention stat-
utes.30 But that debate, like Salerno, centered on the question of whether the 
Constitution categorically prohibits the practice. A few scholars did raise the 
question of whether defendants should be uniquely subject to preventive inter-
ference. Professor Tribe asserted that they should not: “If two men appear 
equally likely to commit a violent crime, it is arbitrary to imprison the man who 
is about to be tried for a past oﬀense while imposing no restraint on the man 
 
28. Note that this question does not arise for restraint to prevent ﬂight or obstruction of justice, 
because those risks are unique to the pretrial process. There are pressing questions, however, 
about what restraints are permissible to mitigate the risks of ﬂight and obstruction. See, e.g., 
R.A. Duﬀ, Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 125-28 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (arguing for limitations on 
pretrial restraints to prevent obstructive harms); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017) (raising questions about the utility and constitutionality of money 
bail as a mechanism to ensure appearance); Wiseman, supra note 12, at 1350 (arguing that 
“non-dangerous defendants” have a right to electronic monitoring, in lieu of detention, to 
prevent ﬂight). 
29. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
30. See, e.g., John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. 
REV. 1223 (1969) (arguing that pretrial preventive detention is constitutional); Tribe, supra 
note 22 (arguing against Mitchell); infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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who is not facing trial.”31 A handful of other scholars have made similar obser-
vations.32 None, though, has given the question more than passing attention. 
It is now widely assumed that the state does indeed have special crime-pre-
vention authority in the pretrial realm. Many believe that, as a general matter, 
the state may not restrain people who are responsible agents solely to prevent 
them from committing speculative future harm.33 But defendants are presumed 
to be diﬀerent. In both legal and moral terms, they are believed to be uniquely 
subject to preventive interference. 
This Article challenges that broadly held view. It argues that, for purposes of 
preventive restraint, there is no clear, relevant distinction between defendants 
and non-defendants who are equally dangerous. (Once again, I use the term 
“preventive restraint” to mean pretrial restraint to prevent non-case-related fu-
ture crime. It is synonymous with “restraint for general dangerousness,” and dis-
tinct from restraint to prevent harm to speciﬁc witnesses or other obstruction of 
justice.) In terms of positive law, and contrary to common belief, there is no con-
stitutional text or doctrine that clearly grants the state more expansive preventive 
authority over defendants than non-defendants. Similarly, there is no clear nor-
mative basis for subjecting defendants to preventive restraint that we would not 
tolerate for equally dangerous people not accused of any crime. And the practical 
justiﬁcations proﬀered to support the special preventive restraint of defendants 
are, at best, incomplete. 
For purposes of preventive restraint, then, a defendant and non-defendant 
who pose equal risk are identical in the only relevant sense, which is riskiness. In 
line with the bedrock principle that like cases should be treated alike,34 this con-
clusion implies a normative principle that I term “parity of preventive authority” 
or “the parity principle.” The parity principle holds that the state has no greater 
authority to preventively restrain a defendant than it does a non-defendant who 
poses an equal risk. If a sixteen percent chance of arrest in the next six months is 
insuﬃcient to justify short-term detention of a non-accused person, it is likewise 
insuﬃcient to justify pretrial detention. 
 
31. Tribe, supra note 22, at 405. 
32. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
113, 119 n.15 (1996) (noting that it is not clear why preventive detention of a defendant “is 
more justiﬁable than for any other person posing an equal risk of similar harmdoing”). 
33. See, e.g., Duﬀ, supra note 28, at 128 (explaining that, according to “traditional liberal” princi-
ples, “[r]esponsible agents ought to be le� free to determine their own conduct . . . and are 
properly liable to coercion only if and when they embark on a criminal enterprise”). 
34. John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 59 (1987) (“Like cases should be treated alike: 
This form[u]la of Aristotle is widely accepted as a core element of egalitarian moral and social 
philosophy.” (citing ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA § 1131a-b (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon 
Press 1925) (c. 384 B.C.E.))). 
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The Article’s objective is not, however, to prove the parity principle conclu-
sively. The goal is simply to demonstrate that an assumed premise of pretrial 
reform is highly questionable. At the very least, the notion that defendants are 
uniquely liable to preventive interference demands much more thorough justiﬁ-
cation than legislatures, courts, or scholars have provided to date. Given the tra-
jectory of pretrial reform, it is both an important and an opportune time to clar-
ify the contours of the state’s pretrial powers. This Article aspires to begin the 
conversation, not to end it. 
More broadly, the Article aims to assess the extent to which bail policy is 
inﬂuenced by a perception that people entangled with the criminal justice system 
are inherently less deserving as legal subjects. Whether conscious or not, that 
perception can shape law and policy. This Article strives to promote disciplined 
thinking about whether there is good reason for defendants to be subject to re-
laxed standards for preventive restraint beyond an assumption that their liberty 
deserves less protection.35 
Finally, to the extent that the parity principle is correct, it is important to 
note that it is not fatal to pretrial preventive detention. The state currently en-
gages in many types of preventive detention outside of criminal proceedings, in-
cluding civil commitment, commitment of “sexually violent predators,” material 
witness detention, protective custody of substance abusers, immigration deten-
tion, quarantine, and the detention of suspected terrorists.36 At least some of 
these practices reﬂect a societal judgment that dangerousness alone can justify 
 
35. See Duﬀ, supra note 28, at 120 (suggesting that pretrial detention incurs little outrage because 
“the defendant is seen as being in fact an oﬀender, who awaits only the formal verdict of the 
court before receiving the punishment he deserves”); cf. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs 
and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 903 (2015) (“One reason the coercion 
costs of policing are neglected is that many of them accrue to the targets of policing . . . .”). 
36. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 152-67 (2014) (discuss-
ing forms of preventive detention in the United States and internationally); Adam Klein & 
Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECU-
RITY J. 85, 87 (2011) (cataloging the “diverse statutes and regimes authorizing the preventive 
detention of individuals not convicted of a crime to prevent harms caused by that person”). 
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detention, even of people who qualify as responsible agents.37 Many legal com-
mentators reject that judgment and aspire to change it,38 although not all do.39 
If dangerousness alone can indeed justify detention at some threshold of risk, 
then the parity principle permits pretrial preventive detention at that threshold. 
This Article does not purport to establish what degree of future-crime risk 
might authorize preventive restraint of non-defendants. But, drawing on current 
law, it suggests that the threshold cannot be less than a substantial risk of serious 
violent crime in a six-month span.40 Pretrial preventive restraint should therefore 
be limited to defendants who present a risk at or above that threshold. And risk 
assessment tools should both measure and communicate the likelihood of rear-
rest speciﬁcally for violent crime. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a brief history of pretrial 
restraint for dangerousness and an introduction to pretrial risk assessment. Part 
II argues that there is no clear constitutional, moral, or practical basis for treating 
defendants as a special case for purposes of preventive restraint. Part III outlines 
the resulting parity principle and draws out its policy implications. 
 
37. See, e.g., David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 693, 695 (2009) (“In reality, . . . preventive detention is already an integral fea-
ture of the American legal landscape.”); Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal 
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 124 (2005) (noting “the widespread promulgation of new incapac-
itation regimes” that condition detention on dangerousness alone, without the “traditional” 
prerequisites of a conviction or serious mental illness). 
38. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Conﬁnement of Dangerous Oﬀenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
56, 56 (2004) (concluding “that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually 
assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the 
American constitutional regime”); Tribe, supra note 22, at 371 (arguing that a proposal to de-
tain “hard core recidivists” is misguided in light of “the dubious ability of pretrial preventive 
detention to contribute to the control of crime”); Alec Walen, A Uniﬁed Theory of Detention, 
with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 877 (2011) 
(“[A]n individual may not be deprived of his liberty unless the reasons for doing so respect 
his status as an autonomous person.”). 
39. E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive 
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781, 782 (2011) (“While we have no intention of 
defending all or even most forms of preventive detention in their concrete instantiations, we 
think that preventive detention is, under many circumstances, a legitimate and principled part 
of the criminal law.”); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Deten-
tion as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1456 (2001) (arguing that an explicit preven-
tive regime would be preferable to current practice of “cloaking” prevention as punishment); 
Slobogin, supra note 37, at 122 (making the case for a pure preventive regime). 
40. See infra notes 303-306 and accompanying text. 
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i .  a new regime of pretrial preventive restraint 
A. Origins of Pretrial Restraint for Dangerousness 
Until the 1960s, the stated function of the pretrial system was to ensure the 
appearance of the accused at trial.41 This remains the central function that the 
institution of bail is designed to serve.42 An accused person deposits some secu-
rity with the court to guarantee his appearance; so long as he does in fact appear, 
the deposit is returned to him at the conclusion of the case. 
But authorities on pretrial law and policy—including pretrial laws them-
selves—now universally identify a second purpose of the pretrial system: pro-
tecting the public from harm at the hands of dangerous defendants.43 Nearly all 
U.S. jurisdictions authorize courts to impose pretrial conditions of release on the 
basis of dangerousness.44 Some authorize full-scale preventive detention as 
well.45 Commentators disagree as to when pretrial law ﬁrst endorsed restraint 
for dangerousness. Capital defendants have been excluded from bail since colo-
nial days, and there is some evidence that this exclusion was a public-safety 
measure.46 But there is also evidence to the contrary.47 For noncapital defend-
ants, though, U.S. pretrial law was at least purportedly centered on ensuring ap-
pearance until the 1960s, when the system underwent a profound shi�. 
 
41. See, e.g., Haldane Robert Mayer, Preventive Detention and the Proposed Amendment to the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525, 529 (1969) (“Our pretrial bail laws have always 
had as their sole purpose the ensuring of the defendant’s appearance at trial.”). 
42. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Since the function of bail is limited, the ﬁxing of 
bail . . . must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of 
th[e] defendant.”); Note, supra note 22, at 1489 (“In theory, the sole danger at which bail is 
aimed is the possibility of ﬂight . . . .”). 
43. See infra notes 54-56, 120, 307-311 and accompanying text. 
44. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.   
45. See infra notes 54-56, 307-311 and accompanying text. 
46. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (guaranteeing a right to bail in noncapital 
cases) (repealed 1984); JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND 
DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 55-59 (1979) (explaining “classic” state constitutional bail 
clause as excluding those charged with capital oﬀenses); A. HIGHMORE, A DIGEST OF THE DOC-
TRINE OF BAIL: IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES vii, 194-96 (1783) (explaining that some are ex-
cluded from bail so that “the safety of the people should be preserved against the lawless dep-
redations of atrocious oﬀenders”); Mitchell, supra note 30, at 1225-26 & n.17 (interpreting 
colonial bail clauses). 
47. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *294 (“[I]n . . . oﬀences of a capital nature, no 
bail can be a security equivalent to the actual custody of the person. For what is there that a 
man may not be induced to forfeit, to save his own life?”); Tribe, supra note 22, at 401 (con-
cluding that pretrial release was traditionally denied for oﬀenses that “carried heavier penalties 
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The 1960s saw the ﬁrst major wave of bail reform.48 That movement, like 
the present one, was catalyzed by the realization that the cash bail system dis-
criminated dramatically against the poor.49 Reformers sought to limit money 
bail in favor of release without bail, also known as release on recognizance 
(ROR). Ultimately, reform eﬀorts led to the liberalization of pretrial release pol-
icies nationwide.50 
This ﬁrst wave of reform also had unintended consequences, however. As 
both release and crime rates rose in the late 1960s, political pressure built for the 
development of new methods to contain pretrial crime. In the past, judges had 
routinely prevented defendants they viewed as dangerous from getting out of 
jail by setting unattainable bail amounts—a practice known as sub rosa preventive 
detention.51 Reform made that method more diﬃcult, and proposals to author-
ize more explicit forms of preventive restraint began to surface.52 
Between 1968 and 1984, the pretrial system transformed itself again. During 
this “second generation” of bail reform,53 thirty-four states amended their stat-
utory laws to authorize detention without bail or restrictive conditions of release 
 
and therefore involved a greater temptation to ﬂee,” and to protect accused persons from vig-
ilante justice). 
48. I borrow the terminology of ﬁrst-, second-, and third- generation or wave bail reform from 
Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a 
Framework for American Pretrial Reform, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 18 (Aug. 2014), http://
static.nicic.gov/UserShared/2014-11-05_ﬁnal_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/R5TX-UWRK]. 
49. See, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2-3 (1985). 
50. The movement culminated in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, which mandated that non-capital 
federal defendants be released with the least restrictive conditions that would “reasonably as-
sure the appearance of the person” for trial. Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(a), 80 Stat. 214, 214 
(1966) (codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)) (repealed 1984). 
51. Concerns about this practice were one motivation for ﬁrst-wave reform. See, e.g., Hairston v. 
United States, 343 F.2d 313, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (“Setting high bail 
to deny release discriminate[s] between the dangerous rich and the dangerous poor and 
masks the diﬃcult problems of predicting future behavior . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)); BERNARD BOTEIN ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT xxix (1965) (“A substantial body of opinion sup-
ports the view that setting high bail to detain dangerous oﬀenders is unconstitutional.”). 
52. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541, at 6 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2296 (noting 
that preventive detention for noncapital defendants was “beyond the scope of the present pro-
posal and involves many diﬃcult and complex problems which require deep study and anal-
ysis”); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 335, 344 (1990) (suggesting that the decline in the use of sub rosa detention may have 
encouraged legislators to develop a more “express ground for detention”). 
53. Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 1. 
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on the basis of dangerousness.54 Many amended their constitutions along the 
same lines.55 Congress passed two statutes authorizing preventive detention for 
noncapital defendants, ﬁrst in the District of Columbia and then throughout the 
federal system via the Bail Reform Act of 1984.56 
Initially, preventive detention of noncapital defendants was highly contro-
versial. Critics argued that the Constitution prohibits detention of people who 
are responsible agents solely to prevent intentional future harm.57 The case that 
tested that argument was United States v. Salerno.58 The defendants in the under-
lying proceeding, Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro, had been detained pur-
suant to the 1984 Bail Reform Act.59 They argued that the detention regime, on 
its face, violated substantive due process, procedural due process, and the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of “[e]xcessive bail.”60 The Second Circuit agreed, 
holding that substantive due process “prohibits the total deprivation of liberty 
simply as a means of preventing future crimes.”61 
The Supreme Court rejected this view.62 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, concluded that none of the constitutional provisions invoked by the 
defendants categorically prohibits preventive detention.63 Such detention, the 
Court held, may be constitutionally permissible if the danger is suﬃciently acute 
 
54. Id. at 15; Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 52, at 344-45. 
55. Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 52, at 344-45. 
56. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 
84 Stat. 473 (codiﬁed at D.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-1321 to -1323 (West 2017)); Bail Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50, 3062 (2012)). 
57. See generally, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Conﬁnement: A Suggested Framework for Con-
stitutional Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1973) (noting that “[l]eading scholars of the 
criminal law have . . . inveighed against preventive conﬁnement”); Tribe, supra note 22, at 407 
(concluding that preventive detention “violates the basic principle that an accusation of crime 
should not subject any man to imprisonment unless the government’s need to prosecute him 
compels incarceration”). 
58. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
59. Id. at 743. 
60. Id. at 745-46; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”). 
61. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
62. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-55. 
63. Id. at 748, 753. 
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and the detention at issue is a suﬃciently tailored means of addressing that dan-
ger.64 The Court found that the federal detention regime did not fail these crite-
ria as a facial matter.65 
Salerno eﬀectively ended the preventive detention debate. The Court had an-
swered the core question with a resounding “no”: the Constitution does not cat-
egorically prohibit preventive detention. Perhaps because the critics’ defeat on 
this point was so total, Salerno was widely perceived as a robust endorsement of 
pretrial preventive detention and lesser forms of preventive restraint.66 
In fact, Salerno’s holding was relatively narrow. Although the Court held that 
neither the Due Process Clause nor the Eighth Amendment prohibits preventive 
detention entirely, it also recognized that each does limit the state’s detention au-
thority. The Salerno Court explained that pretrial detention will constitute pun-
ishment—and so violate substantive due process—if it is irrational or “excessive” 
in relation to its regulatory goal, or if it is inﬂicted with punitive intent.67 More-
over, the Court implied that even non-punitive detention can violate substantive 
 
64. Id. at 747-48 (holding that the challenged detention regime did not categorically constitute 
impermissible punishment because “the incidents of detention” were not “excessive in relation 
to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve”); id. at 747 (explaining that detention re-
gime applied only to those charged with “the most serious crimes” and included both proce-
dural protections and a time limit); id. at 750-51 (ﬁnding that detention regime did not cate-
gorically violate substantive due process because it “narrowly focuses on a particularly acute 
problem in which the Government interests are overwhelming”); id. at 750 (explaining that 
regime operated “only on individuals who have been arrested for a speciﬁc category of ex-
tremely serious oﬀenses” who posed a “demonstrable danger to the community,” and that the 
regime was further limited by an array of procedural protections). 
65. Id. at 751-52. 
66. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the 
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1349 (2012) (“Most practitioners and scholars 
have concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Salerno pronounced the death knell for 
challenges to preventative detention.”); Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Inno-
cence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 725 (2011) (“While several legal scholars commented on bail and 
detention during the 1970s and 1980s, few contemporary legal scholars have analyzed the 
results of the changes in pretrial release standards and loss of the presumption of innocence.”); 
Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 420 (2016) (“Bail historically 
received wide scholarly attention, but this attention waned in the a�ermath of United States v. 
Salerno . . . .”); Chalmous G. Reemes, Case Note, United States v. Salerno: The Validation of 
Preventive Detention and the Denial of a Presumed Constitutional Right to Bail, 41 ARK. L. REV. 
697, 721 (1988). 
67. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-48; see also Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“In evaluating 
the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention . . . the proper inquiry 
is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”). 
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due process if not carefully tailored to its goal,68 and might also violate the Ex-
cessive Bail Clause if it is excessive “in light of the perceived evil” it is designed 
to address.69 Finally, detention regimes that lack the “extensive” procedural safe-
guards of the Bail Reform Act might violate procedural due process.70 The Court 
explicitly le� the door open for as-applied challenges pursuant to any of these 
provisions.71 Acknowledging that pretrial liberty is the “general rule,”72 Salerno 
concluded by aﬃrming that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention 
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”73 
The years since have belied this statement. Before 1984, around twenty-four 
percent of federal defendants were detained until trial.74 By 2010 the number was 
at least sixty-four percent,75 with seventy-six percent of federal defendants de-
tained for some period of time.76 As-applied constitutional challenges are infre-
quently brought and rarely succeed. Lower courts regularly ﬁnd that federal pre-
trial detention is warranted without rigorous analysis of whether detention is an 
excessive response to the threat at issue.77 
One reason that Salerno’s limits have had so little traction is that they remain 
amorphous. Any “excessiveness” inquiry necessarily requires some accounting 
 
68. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-51. 
69. Id. at 754. 
70. Id. at 751-52. 
71. See id. at 745 (noting that “[t]he fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally 
under some conceivable set of circumstances is insuﬃcient to render it wholly invalid”); id. at 
751 (alluding to possibility that challenged procedures “might be insuﬃcient in some partic-
ular circumstances”); see also Appleman, supra note 66, at 1349-51 (exploring how Salerno 
leaves open the possibility of bringing an as-applied challenge to the Bail Reform Act). 
72. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749. 
73. Id. at 755. 
74. Pretrial Release and Detention: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, BUREAU JUST. STAT.  1 (Feb. 1988), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prd-bra84.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5N8-F2AF]. 
75. Thomas H. Cohen, Pretrial Detention and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 1995-2010, BU-
REAU JUST. STAT. 1, 2 (Feb. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdmfdc9510.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3M9B-LTF8]. This percentage represents the number of defendants de-
tained for the entire duration of a case. 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 104 (7th Cir. 1991) (“If judge and prosecutor 
are doing all they reasonably can be expected to do to move the case along, and the statutory 
criteria for pretrial detention are satisﬁed, then we do not think a defendant should be allowed 
to maintain a constitutional challenge to that detention.”); United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 
796, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We reject Hare’s challenge under the excessive-bail clause of the 
Eighth Amendment as foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Sa-
lerno.”); United States v. Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985) (ﬁnding that “Congress in-
tended to equate traﬃc in drugs with a danger to the community”). 
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for the risk at issue and the expected crime-prevention beneﬁt the restraint 
achieves by reducing that risk.78 The Salerno Court did not indicate with any 
precision what degree of risk it thought constitutionally suﬃcient to justify de-
tention. It noted that the Bail Reform Act “operates only on individuals who have 
been arrested for a speciﬁc category of extremely serious oﬀenses,” whom Con-
gress had found to be “far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the 
community a�er arrest.”79 The Court also emphasized that under the Act, before 
detention can be imposed, the government must show that the defendant pre-
sents “a demonstrable danger to the community,” and the trial court must ﬁnd 
“that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community 
or any person.”80 But these standards are extremely vague. What conditions of 
release provide “reasonable assurance” of safety, and under what circumstances? 
What probability of crime risk qualiﬁes as “demonstrable danger”? Salerno itself 
provides little guidance. 
B. The Third Generation of Bail Reform 
A third wave of bail reform is now underway. Despite the ambitions of the 
ﬁrst two waves, most jurisdictions never fully implemented regimes of preven-
tive detention or non-ﬁnancial conditions of release. They have instead contin-
ued to rely on money bail and sub rosa detention as a crude mechanism for man-
aging pretrial crime risk.81 Indeed, since 1990, both pretrial detention rates and 
the use of money bail have risen steeply; it is likely that we now detain millions 
of people each year for their inability to post even small amounts of bail.82 This 
 
78. See Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 4, at 782-83. 
79. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 127 A.3d 100, 125 n.4 (Conn. 2015) (Palmer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t 
is undisputed that the trial court intentionally set a bond that far exceeded an amount that the 
defendant could pay solely to ensure that he would be incarcerated . . . due to his perceived 
dangerousness.”); Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 11, at 547 (concluding, on the basis of 
empirical analysis of defendants who remain detained on money bail, that “judges are basing 
their [bail] decisions far more on predicted violence than on predicted ﬂight”); Wiseman, 
supra note 66, at 434 (noting that eﬀorts to limit money bail “have met stiﬀ, o�en successful 
resistance from the powerful bail bondsman lobby”). 
82. At midyear 2014 there were an estimated 467,500 people awaiting trial in local jails, up from 
349,800 in 2000 and 298,100 in 1996. Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, Prison and Jail In-
mates at Midyear 1996, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 7 (Jan. 1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub
/pdf/pjimy96.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NJA-PG2S]; Minton & Zeng, supra note 2, at 3. Be-
tween 1990 and 1994, 41% of pretrial releases were ROR and 24% were by cash bail. In 2002 
and 2004, 23% of releases were ROR and 42% were by cash bail. Thomas H. Cohen & Brian 
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fact has galvanized a third reform movement, driven in part by national policy 
organizations, that aspires to achieve lasting change by shi�ing the entire pretrial 
paradigm from a cash-based to a risk-based model.83 
The new reform model requires jurisdictions to sort defendants through ac-
tuarial risk assessment.84 The key advantage of actuarial assessment is that it is 
formulaic. Whereas clinical risk assessment relies on an expert’s subjective judg-
ment, actuarial assessment is mechanistic and statistical. It tells us the likelihood 
that person A will have outcome X, extrapolated statistically on the basis of the 
past outcomes of other individuals with similar traits.85 
 
A. Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2 (Nov. 2007), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2C7-LWX5]. As of 
2015, ﬁnancial conditions of release were imposed in 61% of criminal cases nationwide. Jessica 
Eaglin & Danyelle Solomon, Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Jails: Recommendations 
for Local Practice, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 19 (June 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org
/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf [http://
perma.cc/84NR-YA54]. With respect to detention for inability to post bail, see Heaton, May-
son & Stevenson, supra note 4, at 736 tbl.1, which reports that 53% of misdemeanor defendants 
in Harris County, Texas are detained pretrial; Mary T. Phillips et al., Annual Report 2013, 
N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY 30 (Dec. 2014), http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/doc-view
.php?module=reports&module_id=1410&doc_name=doc [http://perma.cc/G6V6-QJPX], 
which reports that 30% of felony defendants and 46% of non-felony defendants whose bail 
was $500 or less were detained until disposition; and Reaves, supra note 3, at 15, which reports 
that nine in ten felony defendants detained until disposition had bail set. 
83. See, e.g., Christopher Moraﬀ, U.S. Cities Are Looking for Alternatives to Cash Bail, NEXT CITY 
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/cities-alternatives-cash-bail [http://perma
.cc/R9LM-49DH]; Rational and Transparent Bail Decision Making: Moving From a Cash-Based 
to a Risk-Based Process, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Mar. 2012), http://www.pretrial.org/download
/pji-reports/Rational%20and%20Transparent%20Bail%20Decision%20Making.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G7MR-47CY]. 
84. See, e.g., Civil Rights Division, Dear Colleague Letter from Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Vanita Gupta and Dir. Lisa Foster, U.S. Dep’t Just. (Mar. 14, 2016) http://www.justice.gov 
/crt/ﬁle/832461/download [http://perma.cc/YM32-EZHH] (urging courts to “consider 
transitioning from a system based on secured monetary bail alone to one grounded in objec-
tive risk assessments by pretrial experts”); Pretrial Risk Assessment, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., 
http://pretrial.org/solutions/risk-assessment [http://perma.cc/G2TJ-6DZ8] (“Jurisdictions 
should have a pretrial services program or similar entity that conducts a risk assessment on all 
defendants in custody awaiting the initial appearance in court.”). 
85. E.g., John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405-06 (2006) (deﬁning “clinical” versus “actuarial” 
prediction); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statis-
tical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1423 (1979) (“A clinical deci-
sionmaker is not committed in advance of decision to the factors that will be considered and 
the rule for combining them.”). The clinical/actuarial dichotomy is not a clean one. Many 
“actuarial” assessments require determinations about traits like drug addiction, which require 
some subjective judgment. 
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Currently, the dominant methodology in the pretrial context is the use of a 
simple checklist tool, or “risk assessment instrument.” Statisticians develop such 
tools by analyzing aggregated pretrial data to identify the traits of defendants 
that correlate most closely with the outcome of concern.86 Those traits are 
deemed “risk factors.”87 The developers then create a checklist that assigns each 
risk factor a number of points corresponding to how closely it is correlated with 
the bad outcome in the group data.88 Having been arrested before age eighteen 
might be three points, for example, and being unemployed might be two. To 
calculate an individual’s risk score, one simply checks oﬀ the risk factors that 
apply and adds up the points. While some tools are only available as paper check-
lists and require manual administration, others are oﬀered as automated or par-
tially automated so�ware.89 
Existing pretrial tools assess the risk of two outcomes: failure to appear 
(FTA) and rearrest. Most of the existing instruments produce a single score that 
 
86. For further explanation of this process, see generally Cynthia A. Mamalian, State of the Science 
of Pretrial Risk Assessment, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (2011), http://www.pretrial.org/wp�-ﬁle/pji
-state-of-the-science-pretrial-risk-assessment-2011-pdf [http://perma.cc/R7ZW-6XG6]; 
and Pretrial Risk Assessment: Science Provides Guidance on Assessing Defendants, PRETRIAL JUST. 
INST. 3-4 (May 2015) [hereina�er Pretrial Risk Assessment], http://university.pretrial.org
/viewdocument/issue-brief-pretrial-1 [http://perma.cc/67PJ-6SLX]. 
87. See, e.g., Mamalian, supra note 86, at 9. 
88. That is, diﬀerent factors may be “weighted” diﬀerently. See, e.g., Public Safety Assessment: Risk 
Factors and Formula, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. 3 (2016) [hereina�er LJAF, Public Safety], 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula
.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CBE-5W37] (explaining weighting of diﬀerent risk factors). Some in-
struments include a series of risk “scales” rather than binary yes-or-no factors. See, e.g., 
Thomas Blomberg et al., Validation of the COMPAS Risk Assessment Classiﬁcation Instrument, 
CTR. FOR CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y RES. 10 (2010), http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content
/uploads/Validation-of-the-COMPAS-Risk-Assessment-Classiﬁcation-Instrument.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/A4PL-DXGY] (“In total, the COMPAS includes 15 diﬀerent factors, each of 
which is measured using multiple item scales.”). 
89. See, e.g., COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment System: Selected Questions Posed by Inquiring Agen-
cies, NORTHPOINTE INC. 9 (2012), http://www.northpointeinc.com/ﬁles/downloads/FAQ
_Document.pdf [http://perma.cc/JR2A-5CZH] (discussing technical support for COMPAS 
so�ware). The company behind the COMPAS, Northpointe Inc., seems to have rebranded 
itself as equivant and no longer advertises the COMPAS as a pretrial classiﬁcation tool. North-
pointe’s former web address, www.northpointeinc.com (where it used to advertise the COM-
PAS suite so�ware for multiple uses) now redirects visitors to equivant.com, which advertises 
the COMPAS classiﬁcation system as a tool for jail/prison management only. See COMPAS 
Classiﬁcation, EQUIVANT, http://www.equivant.com/solutions/inmate-classiﬁcation [http://
perma.cc/8PWZ-UP39] (“The COMPAS Classiﬁcation so�ware is a management support 
tool that can be interfaced with existing jail management systems to provide critical inmate 
management information to help support all aspects of a jail’s classiﬁcation operations.”). 
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represents the risk of either one occurring.90 As Lauryn Gouldin has explained, 
this aggregation is a problem.91 The two risks are diﬀerent in kind, are best pre-
dicted by diﬀerent variables, and are most eﬀectively managed in diﬀerent 
ways.92 It is to be hoped and expected that the next generation of tools will meas-
ure each outcome separately. 
Around forty jurisdictions are now using risk assessment tools, and the num-
ber is growing fast.93 This momentum is due in large part to the Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation (LJAF), which developed an instrument designed to func-
tion in any jurisdiction (the PSA) and has made it freely available.94 The PSA 
improves on other tools by separately assessing the risks of nonappearance, re-
arrest, and rearrest on a violent charge.95 
 
90. The PSA and COMPAS are the exceptions. They produce separate scores for ﬂight and rear-
rest, and can also assess each person’s risk of rearrest for a violent crime speciﬁcally. See 
Blomberg et al., supra note 88, at 18; LJAF, Developing a National Model, supra note 7, at 3-4. 
91. Gouldin, Disentangling, supra note 12, at 842 (explaining that this aggregation “reinforces . . . 
judges’ muddling of ﬂight risk and dangerousness in the pretrial process”). 
92. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 11, at 547 (concluding on the basis of an empirical study 
that predictors of ﬂight and of future violent crime “are almost completely uncorrelated”); 
Gouldin, Disentangling, supra note 12, at 893, 897 (“Risk assessment tools that generate a cu-
mulative risk of pretrial failure have limited utility.”). 
93. Where Pretrial Improvements Are Happening, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 4 (2017), http:// 
university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/where-pretrial-improvements-are-hap-2 [http://
perma.cc/G9FE-68AN] (reporting that the PSA in now in use throughout New Jersey, Ken-
tucky, and Arizona and in thirty additional counties); id. at 14 (reporting that Delaware, Ne-
vada, Washington, Hawaii, and three additional counties have recently received technical as-
sistance to implement or improve pretrial risk assessment); sources cited infra note 96 
(indicating that the federal courts and at least some counties in Colorado, Florida, Indiana, 
Ohio, and Virginia use a pretrial risk assessment tool); see also Jessica DaSilva, Hundreds of 
Jurisdictions Clamor for Pretrial Risk Test, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www
.bna.com/hundreds-jurisdictions-clamor-n73014445751 [http://perma.cc/H9T4-RRMU]. 
94. Where Pretrial Improvements Are Happening, supra note 93 (describing pretrial reform, includ-
ing shi� toward risk assessment, in jurisdictions nationwide); Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing 
Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html [http://perma.cc/4HA5 
-BFGL]; Press Release, Laura & John Arnold Found., More Than 20 Cities and States Adopt 
Risk Assessment Tool To Help Judges Decide Which Defendants To Detain Prior to Trial  
(June 26, 2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-and-states-adopt 
-risk-assessment-tool-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-to-detain-prior-to-trial 
[http://perma.cc/P8QA-FHH8]. 
95. LJAF, Developing a National Model, supra note 7, at 4-5. There are at least six other tools in 
current use. They include the Federal Pretrial Risk Assessment (PTRA), Colorado Pretrial 
Risk Assessment Tool (CPAT), Florida Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (FL PRAI), In-
diana Risk Assessment System-Pretrial Assessment Tool (IRAS-PAT), Ohio Risk Assessment 
System-Pretrial Assessment Tool (ORAS-PAT), Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument 
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The number of risk factors included in current tools varies from seven to 
ﬁ�een, and the factors themselves vary across tools. Table 1 provides a basic over-
view.96 In addition to these scoring instruments, there is a more advanced meth-
odology on the horizon: forecasting through machine-learning technologies.97 
  
 
(VPRAI), and the Correctional Oﬀender Management Proﬁle for Alternative Sanctions 
(COMPAS). See infra note 96 and Table 1. 
96. This chart expands on a model created by the Pretrial Justice Institute, see Pretrial Risk Assess-
ment, supra note 86, at 3, but draws directly from the following sources: Austin et al., supra 
note 15; Blomberg et al., supra note 88, at 15-16; The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT), 
PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 15-18 (Oct. 19, 2012) [hereina�er Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool], 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/CO%20Pretrial%20Assessment
%20Tool%20Report%20Rev%20-%20PJI%202012.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZCR-F7AY]; Fed-
eral PTRA, supra note 14; Indiana Risk Assessment System, UNIV. OF CIN. at 1-1 to 1-2 (Apr.  
23, 2010) [hereina�er Indiana Risk Assessment System], http://www.pretrial.org/download 
/risk-assessment/Indiana%20Risk%20Assessment%20System%20(April%202010).pdf 
[http://perma.cc/K39L-QUAH]; Edward Latessa et al., Creation and Validation of the  
Ohio Risk Assessment System: Final Report, UNIV. OF CIN. 49-50 (July 2009) [hereina�er  
ORAS Final Report], http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Ohio%20Pretrial
%20Risk%20Assessment%202009.pdf [http://perma.cc/JK6L-659Q]; LJAF, Developing a 
National Model, supra note 7, at 3-4; LJAF, Public Safety, supra note 88; LJAF, Results, supra note 
16, at 3; MARIE VANNOSTRAND, VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ASSESSING RISK 
AMONG PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS IN VIRGINIA: THE VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN-
STRUMENT 6 (2003); Marie VanNostrand & Kenneth J. Rose, Pretrial Risk Assessment in Vir-
ginia, LUMINOSITY INC. 2 (May 1, 2009), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment
/VA%20Risk%20Report%202009.pdf [http://perma.cc/E68P-JC95]; Timothy P. Cadigan et 
al., The Re-Validation of the Federal Pretrial Services Risk Assessment (PTRA), 76 FED. PROB. 3 
(2012); Timothy P. Cadigan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in 
the Federal Pretrial Services System, 75 FED. PROB. 30, 32 (2011); Edward J. Latessa et al., The 
Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS), 74 FED. PROB. 16 (2010) 
[hereina�er ORAS Creation and Validation]; Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The 
Development of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73 FED. PROB. 
33 (2009); and Angwin et al., supra note 19. 
97. At its core, a machine-learning risk assessment process is simply a more powerful and complex 
version of a scoring instrument. See generally Richard A. Berk et al., Forecasting Domestic Vio-
lence: A Machine Learning Approach To Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LE-
GAL STUD. 94 (2016) (ﬁnding that if magistrates used machine-learning methods, the rate of 
rearrest for those released a�er an arraignment for domestic violence would be cut nearly in 
half); Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk To Inform Sentencing 
Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222 (2015) (summarizing the results of a machine-learning ap-
proach using “random forests”). 
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TABLE 1. 
SELECTED PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL RISK FACTORS 
 PSA
 
C
O
M
PA
S 
FL PR
A
I 
V
PR
A
I 
C
PA
T
 
PT
R
A
 
O
R
A
S-PA
T
 
IR
A
S-PA
T
 
Separate risk scores for 
FTA/rearrest? 
Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Assesses risk of rearrest for 
violent crime specifically? 
Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Jurisdiction(s) Many FL FL VA CO Fed. OH IN 
Requires Interview No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Static/Dynamic/Both Static Both Both Both Both Both Both Both 
# Factors/Scales 9 15 11 8 12 14 7 7 
Risk Factors: Relate to… 
Current Charge X X X X  X   
Prior Pending Charge(s) X ?  X X X   
Prior Conviction(s) X X X X X X   
Prior Violent Conviction(s) X X  X     
Prior FTA(s) X X X X X X X X 
Residence  X X X X X X X 
Employment  X X X  X X X 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse  X X X X X X X 
Working Phone  ? X  X    
Age  X ? X  X X X X 
Active Warrant(s)  ?   X    
Mental Health  ? X  X    
Under Supervision  ?   X    
Education  X    X   
Citizenship  ?    X   
Marital Status  ? X      
Prior Custodial Sentence X ?   X  X X 
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Depending on a defendant’s numerical risk score, the tools classify that per-
son as low, moderate, or high risk.98 These classiﬁcations do not purport to pre-
dict individual outcomes with anything approaching certainty. A classiﬁcation as 
high risk does not assert that Person A will fail to appear or be rearrested unless 
restrained. All it purports to do is rank Person A relative to the rest of the popu-
lation upon which the instrument was developed. What a “high risk” classiﬁca-
tion actually asserts is that Person A belongs to a group of people with shared 
traits that will have higher levels of nonappearance and rearrest than those out-
side the group.99 
Nonetheless, each classiﬁcation does correspond to some statistical likeli-
hood of nonappearance or rearrest. A risk assessment tool is only valid if the 
group of defendants it classiﬁes as high risk has the highest rate of bad outcomes. 
To “validate” a tool, therefore, researchers use it to classify members of a sample 
set where outcomes are known, then document the rate of the relevant outcome 
for each risk class.100 Validation studies thus illustrate the statistical likelihood of 
a given outcome for defendants grouped in each risk class. 
Validation studies of existing pretrial tools have documented the following 
rates of rearrest among defendants classiﬁed in the highest-risk group.101 
 
  
 
98. Tools use anywhere between three and six risk classes. See, e.g., LJAF, Developing a National 
Model, supra note 7, at 4-5; Pretrial Risk Assessment, supra note 86, at 4. Tool developers must 
decide where, along the curve of rearrest probability, to draw the lines between risk classes. 
These are called “cut points.” See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 19, at 87-88 (explaining cut points, 
using the alternate phrase “cut-oﬀ points”); COMPAS Decile Cut Points Norming, ELEC-
TRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/EPIC 
-16-06-23-WI-FOIA-201600805-DecileCutPointsNorming020216.pdf [http://perma.cc
/63PS-8YV6]. 
99. LJAF, Developing a National Model, supra note 7, at 4-5; Mamalian, supra note 86, at 10. 
100. See, e.g., Cadigan et al., supra note 96. 
101. In the machine-learning context, these rates of the predicted harm would be called “forecast-
ing accuracy.” See Berk & Hyatt, supra note 97, at 224. Note that if an algorithm is applied to a 
diﬀerent population or outcomes are monitored over a diﬀerent time period, the rate will 
likely change. 
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TABLE 2. 
PREDICTIVE ACCURACY FOR HIGHEST-RISK GROUPS 
Tool Outcome Period Rate 
Rearrest for Any Crime 
Federal PTRA102 Any “new criminal arrest” Pretrial period 10% 
FL PRAI103 Any “arrest for another crime” 6 months Approx. 15% 
IRAS-PAT104 Any new arrest ? 17% 
VPRAI105 Any new arrest Pretrial period 29.5% 
PSA106 Any new arrest Pretrial period, 
up to 6 months 
23% 
ORAS-PAT107 Any new arrest or FTA 1 year 29.5% 
CPAT108 Any “new criminal filing,” 
incl. traffic or municipal 
Pretrial period, 
up to 1 year 
42% 
COMPAS109 Any new arrest 6 months 42.1% 
Rearrest for Violent Crime 
COMPAS110 New arrest - violent crime 6 months 8% 
PSA111 New arrest - violent crime Pretrial period, 
up to 6 months 
8.6% 
Berk et al.112 New arrest - domestic  
violence with injury 
2 years 21% 
 
102. Federal PTRA, supra note 14, at 4; Cadigan & Lowenkamp, supra note 96, at 32.  
103. Austin et al., supra note 15, at 4, 11 (showing rate of rearrest just over 15%). 
104. Indiana Risk Assessment System, supra note 96, at 1-1. There is no public documentation of the 
measurement period.  
105. VanNostrand & Rose, supra note 96, at 7-8, 12. 
106. LJAF, Results, supra note 16, at 1, 3. 
107. ORAS Final Report, supra note 96, at 14, 16; ORAS Creation and Validation, supra note 96, at 
19. There is no available data on rearrest rates alone. 
108. Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool, supra note 96, at 9 & n.14, 10 & n.15, 15-18, 18 n.23. 
109. Blomberg et al., supra note 88, at 35. 
110. Id. at 51. 
111. LJAF, Results, supra note 16, at 3. 
112. A team led by Richard Berk developed a machine-learned algorithm for use at the arraignment 
of people charged with domestic violence oﬀenses to forecast rearrest speciﬁcally for domestic 
violence (particularly on a charge involving physical injury). See Berk et al., supra note 97, at 
103-04. 
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Persons classiﬁed as “high risk” by the Federal PTRA have a ten percent 
chance of rearrest in the pretrial period, and so forth. 
It is important to note that the rates depend both on the outcome measure 
and the time over which it is measured. The broader the measure and the longer 
the measurement period, the higher the rate will be. Forty-two percent of those 
deemed highest risk by the CPAT, for instance, have some kind of “new criminal 
ﬁling” in the pretrial period, but that includes traﬃc and municipal case ﬁl-
ings.113 Unfortunately, many of the validation reports that measure “new arrests” 
do not precisely deﬁne that term.114 
The most recent reform model envisions actuarial risk assessment as the ba-
sis for pretrial release and custody decisions.115 Money bail is not to be used to 
mitigate danger.116 Rather, low-risk defendants should be released pending trial; 
moderate-risk defendants should also be released, though potentially with non-
ﬁnancial conditions tailored to risk level; and high-risk defendants should be 
detained.117 The reform model therefore requires that judges have authority to 
order pretrial preventive detention. In general, reformers advocate leaving 
judges some discretion to override risk-based recommendations, though they 
disagree over how much discretion to allow.118 
Implementing this vision will require signiﬁcant changes to state law. 
Twenty-three states still guarantee a broad constitutional right to bail and will 
have to amend their constitutions to authorize preventive detention without 
 
113. Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool, supra note 96, at 18 n.23 (“The public safety rate for the CPAT 
study . . . was deﬁned very broadly as a ﬁling for any new felony, misdemeanor, traﬃc, mu-
nicipal, and petty oﬀense . . . .”). 
114. The information in the table above represents the extent of the deﬁnition of the “new arrest” 
outcome measured in the cited studies. Few of the studies, for instance, specify whether “new 
arrest” includes or excludes arrest for municipal or traﬃc oﬀenses. 
115. See, e.g., LJAF, Developing a National Model, supra note 7, at 5; Mamalian, supra note 86, at 2, 
5. 
116. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS: PRETRIAL RELEASE Standard 10-5.3(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2002) (“Financial conditions of release should not be set to prevent future criminal 
conduct during the pretrial period or to protect the safety of the community or any person.”). 
117. See, e.g., LJAF, Developing a National Model, supra note 7, at 5; Mamalian, supra note 86, at 2; 
Cadigan et al., supra note 96, at 4-6 (explaining that low-risk defendants should not be “over-
supervised,” but that high-risk defendants should generally be detained). 
118. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 66, at 422, 454-477 (arguing that judicial discretion presents a 
“principal-agent problem that must be addressed if we are to ﬁx the bail system,” and propos-
ing mandatory bail guidelines that rely on actuarial risk assessment). 
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bail.119 As for statutory law, every state already authorizes judges to order con-
ditions of release to protect “public safety,” but the current standards are varied, 
ambiguous, and o�en irrational.120 
 
119. These states retain “the traditional state constitutional approach” to bail, which guarantees a 
right to bail except in capital or extremely serious cases when “the proof is evident, or the 
presumption great.” 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.3(b), at 55 (4th 
ed. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Seventeen states guarantee bail except in capital 
cases; the other six extend the exception to treason, murder, rape, or oﬀenses punishable by 
life imprisonment. Id. at 55-56. Of the remaining twenty-seven states, nine prohibit “excessive 
bail” without stating whether bail may be denied altogether. Id. And eighteen already have 
constitutional provisions authorizing pretrial preventive detention, although the provisions 
range widely. Id. 
120. See Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 24, 57-74 (chronicling “great variation” in state constitutional 
and statutory bail provisions); Gouldin, Disentangling, supra note 12, at 866 (noting that state 
statutes direct bail courts to consider various factors, but “do not indicate which factors are 
relevant to ﬂight risk and which are believed to predict dangerousness”); id. at 882-85 (ob-
serving that “many statutes do a poor job of guiding judges about which risks are relevant to 
diﬀerent pretrial decisions,” and providing examples). New York is o�en said to exclude con-
sideration of dangerousness, but it does authorize courts to issue protective orders as condi-
tions of release, and other aspects of its pretrial law also suggest otherwise. See N.Y. CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2017) (describing that considerations for pretrial 
commitment without bail include past criminal record and ﬁrearm use); id. §§ 530.12-14 (au-
thorizing orders of protection); id. § 530.20(2)(a) (prohibiting recognizance or bail when a 
defendant is charged with a class A felony or has two previous felony convictions). Many 
states either permit or require courts to consider dangerousness in setting money bail, which 
contravenes reform principles. See supra note 116. 
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Notwithstanding these hurdles, the reform vision is already becoming a re-
ality, and change is happening fast. At least twenty states and countless munici-
palities have undertaken signiﬁcant pretrial reform eﬀorts in the last few 
years.121 Others are poised to follow.122 
 
121. In fact, reforms are moving forward so fast that it is diﬃcult to keep up. For a helpful overview 
of the landscape, see Where Pretrial Improvements Are Happening, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.  
(July 2017), http://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile
.ashx?DocumentFileKey=f3d149e5-a00c-7022-3e6b-97d0af428010 [http://perma.cc/3WRN
-HHM3]. Kentucky, Colorado, and New Jersey undertook comprehensive reform—including 
amendment of the New Jersey Constitution. See Public Safety and Oﬀender Accountability 
Act, 2011 Ky. Acts 4; Pretrial Servs., Pretrial Reform in Kentucky, ADMIN. OFF. CTS. KY. CT. 
JUST. 5-8 (Jan. 2013), http://www.pretrial.org/download/infostop/Pretrial%20Reform
%20in%20Kentucky%20Implementation%20Guide%202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FMW 
-TM3U]; Timothy R. Schnacke, Best Practices in Bond Setting: Colorado’s New Pretrial Bail Law, 
CTR. FOR LEGAL & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES (July 3, 2013), http://www.pretrial.org 
/download/lawpolicy/Best%20Practices%20in%20Bond%20Setting%20-%20Colorado.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6LMK-PULB]; Matt Arco, Christie Signs Bail Reform Measure, Lauds  
Lawmakers for Bipartisanship, NJ.COM (Aug. 11, 2014, 3:34 PM), http://www.nj.com 
/politics/index.ssf/2014/08/christie_signs_bail_reform_measure_lauds_lawmakers_for 
_bipartisanship.html [http://perma.cc/X8PA-6WGA]. Alabama, Alaska, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, and Ohio 
are actively pursuing reform. See, e.g., Final Report, COMMISSION TO REFORM MD.’S  
PRETRIAL SYS. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial 
-commission-ﬁnal-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2DG-KYA2]; 13 Places that Saw Bail Reform 
in 2016, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016
/12/13_places_that_saw_bail_reform.html [http://perma.cc/425X-6A7W]; Thomas Cole, 
Lawmakers Give Final OK to Bail Reform Measure, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Feb. 17, 2016, 12:09 PM), 
http://www.abqjournal.com/725486/lawmakers-give-ﬁnal-ok-to-bail-reform-measure
.html [http://perma.cc/J3EB-EA5H]; Connecticut Moves To Reform Cash Bail System for Low-
Level Defendants, BETWEEN LINES (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.btlonline.org/2016/seg
/160212bf-btl-mcguire.html [http://perma.cc/66JW-7CH5]; Christopher Connelly, Texas 
Lawmakers, Judges Push for Major Bail Reform, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 10, 2017, 12:31 PM), 
http://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2017/03/10/191236/texaslawmakers 
-judges-push-for-major-bail-reform [http://perma.cc/L4TK-7RH7]; Sara Dorn, Developing 
‘Fair’ Bail System Goal of Ohio Panel: Impact 2016: Justice for All, CLEVELAND.COM (May 18,  
2016, 4:40 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/05/developing_fair_bail 
_system_go.html [http://perma.cc/KM74-6RNB]; Geoﬀ Dornan, Feds Agree To Help Study 
and Pay for Nevada Bail Reform Project, NEV. APPEAL (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nevadaappeal
.com/news/government/feds-agree-to-help-study-and-pay-for-nevada-bail-reform-project 
[http://perma.cc/65BP-RF3L]; Editorial: Reforming Bail Bonds a Must for a Connecticut Second 
Chance Society, NEW HAVEN REG. (Feb. 6, 2016, 10:09 PM), http://www.nhregister.com
/opinion/20160206/editorial-reforming-bail-bonds-a-must-for-a-connecticut-second 
-chance-society [http://perma.cc/8MT6-FS48]; Kim Geiger, Bail Reform Act Signed in Illi-
nois, GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (June 13, 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics
/public-justice-safety/Bail-Reform-Enacted-in-Illinois.html [http://perma.cc/ZR8G 
-PYUE]; James C. McKinley, Jr., State’s Chief Judge, Citing ‘Injustice,’ Lays Out Plans To Alter 
Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/nyregion 
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The reform movement holds great promise, but it also crystallizes funda-
mental questions about pretrial policy: What degree of statistical future-crime 
risk justiﬁes restraint? And is the answer diﬀerent for defendants than for any-
one else? Most criminal-law scholars hold that only serious risk—if any at all—
could justify the purely preventive restraint of a rational member of the general 
population.123 The question this Article aims to address is whether a pending 
criminal charge alters the analysis. 
i i .  defendants and non-defendants who are equally 
dangerous 
There is an understandable basis for assuming that, when it comes to state-
imposed deprivations of liberty, defendants are a special case. Few contest the 
notion that the state has the right to arrest someone if there is probable cause to 
 
/jonathan-lippman-bail-incarceration-new-york-state-chief-judge.html [http://perma.cc
/XEL2-TB5H]; Press Release, Pretrial Justice Inst., PJI Commends Alaska’s Criminal Justice 
Reforms (July 11, 2016), http://www.pretrial.org/pji-commends-alaskas-criminal-justice 
-reforms [http://perma.cc/2343-AMEV]; Smart Pretrial Reform in Delaware, PUB. WELFARE 
FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.publicwelfare.org/smart-pretrial-reform-in-delaware 
[http://perma.cc/P7Y8-3P5U]. 
122. Litigation is spurring considerable change. See Statement of Interest of the United  
States, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015);  
Ending the American Money Bail System, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L. (2014), http://www 
.equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-system 
[http://perma.cc/RSW8-HY6X]; Moraﬀ, supra note 83. At the national level, both Congress 
and the White House have gotten involved. See Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, S. 
1593, 115th Cong. (2017); No Money Bail Act of 2016, H.R. 4611, 114th Cong. (2016); Fact 
Sheet on White House and Justice Department Convening—A Cycle of Incarceration: Prison, Debt 
and Bail Practices, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet 
-white-house-and-justice-department-convening-cycle-incarceration-prison-debt-and 
[http://perma.cc/GX2K-KGP4]. 
123. Many hold that the purely preventive restraint of responsible actors is never permissible, no 
matter the risk they pose, because such restraint denies a person’s autonomy. See sources cited 
supra notes 33, 38; see also, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Jus-
tifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141-42 (2011) 
(describing this orthodoxy). Other scholars accept that the purely preventive restraint of re-
sponsible actors may be permissible in some circumstances, but that substantial preventive 
intrusions could only be permissible to mitigate serious risk. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Col-
lateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 348 (2015) (arguing 
that any preventive restraint should be “an appropriately tailored means of preventing future 
harm, given its cost in liberty”); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (“The proportionality principle requires that the degree of danger be 
roughly proportionate to the proposed government intervention.”). 
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believe she has committed a crime.124 Likewise, few deny that the state has the 
right to detain her or otherwise limit her liberty if necessary to prevent her from 
ﬂeeing or interfering with witnesses. Because it seems abundantly clear that the 
state may restrict defendants’ liberty in special ways for these reasons, it is widely 
assumed that the state may also restrain defendants in special ways to prevent 
future crime. 
Yet the fact that the state can impose special restraints for some purposes (to 
ensure appearance and protect witnesses) does not entail the conclusion that it 
can do so for others (to prevent non-case-related crime). Whether the state does 
have authority to impose unique restraints on defendants to prevent non-case-
related crime depends on the reason why it is authorized to restrain defendants 
to prevent ﬂight and harm to witnesses. One possibility is that the state may 
restrict defendants’ liberty to prevent those obstructive harms because defend-
ants simply have a lesser right to liberty than other people. If that is so, then the 
purpose of the restraint is immaterial. The state’s special authority derives from 
defendants’ inferior rights status, so whatever the purpose of restraint, the 
standards for defendants can be comparatively lax. 
But the justiﬁcation for the state’s authority to restrain defendants to prevent 
obstructive harms may not be that defendants have a reduced right to liberty. 
Rather, it may simply be that the state’s interest in making sure the legal process 
functions—that defendants show up, that witnesses are safe—sometimes 
trumps the individual right to liberty. In other words, it might be the case that 
the powerful state interest in administering a functional criminal justice system 
would justify restricting anyone’s liberty if necessary. It just happens that defend-
ants are the people most likely to derail a prosecution. It makes sense, on this 
account, that defendants are subject to unique restraints—those necessary to 
make the system run. Note, though, that reluctant witnesses are subject to sim-
ilar restraints on the same grounds.125 
If the reason that the state can impose some special restraints on defendants 
is its interest in operating a functional criminal justice system, then the legiti-
macy of those restraints does not mean that the state may also subject defendants 
to special restraints for other purposes. The justiﬁcation for the special treatment 
is a particular state need that happens to uniquely aﬀect defendants. The justiﬁ-
cation is not that defendants have a reduced right to liberty. 
 
124. But see Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2016) (arguing that custodial 
arrest as a means to initiate criminal proceedings may be justiﬁed far less frequently than peo-
ple assume). 
125. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) (providing for the arrest and detention of material witnesses 
when “it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by 
subpoena”). 
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This Part argues for the latter understanding of state authority to restrict in-
dividual liberty in the pretrial realm. On close analysis, there is no constitutional 
doctrine holding that defendants have an inherently reduced right to liberty, or 
authorizing unique restraint of defendants to prevent non-case-related harms. 
Nor, for purposes of preventive restraint, is there any moral or practical basis for 
the state to value defendants’ liberty less than other people’s. In sum, for pur-
poses of preventive restraint, there is no constitutional, moral, or practical dis-
tinction between a defendant and non-defendant who are equally dangerous. 
Some readers may object at the outset that, on average, defendants are more 
dangerous than non-defendants, or that a particular defendant might pose a 
greater threat than any person the state can identify in the population at large. 
These points are taken up later,126 but neither undermines the Article’s argu-
ment. For clarity of exposition, though, the argument focuses on defendants la-
beled high risk on the basis of actuarial assessment. As noted above, a high-risk 
classiﬁcation currently denotes anywhere between a ten percent and a forty-two 
percent chance of a new arrest, or an approximately eight percent chance of new 
arrest for violent crime, over a six-month span.127 With big-data predictive tech-
nologies we could identify plenty of non-defendants who pose an equivalent sta-
tistical risk, but presumably these risk levels alone would not justify restraint of 
a non-defendant. Contrary to popular belief, there is no reason the analysis 
should diﬀer for defendants. 
At risk of repetition, a restatement of terminology may be useful here. The 
argument that follows concerns pretrial burdens on defendants’ liberty or pri-
vacy imposed to prevent non-case-related future crime, which I call, collectively, 
“preventive restraint.” Preventive restraint includes “preventive detention,” by 
which I mean detention imposed to prevent non-case-related crime (or deten-
tion on the basis of “general dangerousness”). Preventive restraint also includes 
conditions of release, like supervision or GPS monitoring, imposed to prevent 
non-case-related crime. For purposes of this Article, “preventive restraint” does 
not include detention or conditions of release imposed to prevent case-related—
or obstructive—harms (ﬂight, harm to witnesses, or other eﬀorts to thwart pros-
ecution). 
 
126. See infra Section III.B. 
127. These numbers depend on the jurisdiction and the tool. See supra Table 2. 
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A. No Clear Constitutional Distinction 
To begin with the positive law: One might imagine that constitutional doc-
trine grants the state more expansive authority to preventively restrain defend-
ants than members of the public at large.128 Because preventive restraint encom-
passes both detention and noncustodial conditions of release like GPS 
monitoring and drug-testing, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on both pre-
trial detention and pretrial searches is relevant.129 A careful reading, however, 
demonstrates that neither line of cases plainly authorizes special standards for 
preventive restraint of defendants. 
1. Pretrial Detention Doctrine 
a. Gerstein and Probable Cause 
The most obvious distinction between defendants and non-defendants who 
are equally dangerous is that the defendants have been charged with a crime. It 
is a common assumption that a criminal charge supported by probable cause 
authorizes the state to hold a person until trial, such that the state grants pretrial 
release at its discretion. If that were the case, constitutional doctrine would in-
deed grant the state more expansive preventive authority over defendants than 
equally dangerous non-defendants. The state could detain any defendant on the 
basis of probable cause alone, regardless of risk. 
But that is not the state of the law. The Supreme Court has never held that 
probable cause alone is a constitutionally suﬃcient ground for extended pretrial 
restraint. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court held that a judicial determination of 
probable cause is a necessary condition for extended pretrial restraints on liberty, 
not that it is a suﬃcient one.130 The Court recently reaﬃrmed the probable-cause 
 
128. Many statutes, of course, currently authorize broad pretrial preventive restraint. But statutory 
law is subject to revision—particularly now, as jurisdictions rewrite their bail laws. The more 
meaningful positive inquiry, therefore, is what the Constitution says in this context. 
129. The Court’s pretrial seizure case law is relevant too, and both Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 
(1975), and Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017), can also be categorized as Fourth 
Amendment pretrial seizure cases. For simplicity, I limit the discussion to detention and 
search cases. 
130. 420 U.S. at 114 (“[W]e hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”). If a judicial 
determination of probable cause were suﬃcient to justify any pretrial restraint, Salerno would 
have been an easy case indeed! Accord Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the 
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requirement in Manuel v. City of Joliet.131 That decision also asserts only that 
probable cause is a necessary prerequisite for severe pretrial restraint; the Court 
did not say that probable cause alone is suﬃcient to justify such restraint. And 
Salerno clariﬁed that pretrial liberty is the norm.132 Serious incursions on pretrial 
liberty require justiﬁcation beyond probable cause.133 
Yet Gerstein and Manuel might still appear to suggest that the state has 
broader preventive authority over defendants than equally dangerous non-de-
fendants. The fact that probable cause is a necessary condition of pretrial pre-
ventive restraint might suggest that it is a necessary condition of any preventive 
restraint.134 In other words, one conceivable reading of Gerstein and Manuel is 
that dangerousness can never justify extended restraint without an arrest sup-
ported by probable cause. 
But this reading is not plausible. Most simply, it would appear to prohibit 
other preventive detention schemes the Court has upheld, including the civil 
commitment of sexually violent predators.135 The commitment scheme the 
Court upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks did require a charge or conviction for a sex-
ually violent crime at some point in the past, as well as a ﬁnding of probable 
cause to believe the putative detainee was a sexually violent predator likely to 
reoﬀend in the future,136 but neither of these requirements would satisfy the 
Gerstein pretrial rule. Gerstein requires probable cause for a pending criminal 
charge—not for a charge adjudicated in the past, nor for a ﬁnding of dangerous-
ness.137 
 
Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 560 (1986) (“Ger-
stein did not hold that defendants could be imprisoned to protect the community from crime 
simply because judges had found probable cause for their arrests.”). 
131. 137 S. Ct. at 913. 
132. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”). 
133. Id. 
134. Many thanks to Alec Walen and the editors of the Yale Law Journal for raising this possibility. 
135. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
136. Id. at 357. 
137. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (deﬁning probable cause as “facts and circumstances 
‘suﬃcient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was 
committing an oﬀense’” (alteration in original) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 
(1964))). Gerstein does not explicitly specify that probable cause for an already adjudicated 
charge is inadequate to support a new arrest, but that is obvious from the language and con-
text of the decision. 
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The more plausible reading of Gerstein and Manuel is that the Court’s atten-
tion in those cases was focused on the pretrial realm. The opinions do not con-
template detention regimes falling outside that space. Even within the pretrial 
context, neither Gerstein nor Manuel speciﬁcally discusses restraint for general 
dangerousness.138 They thus do not preclude detention for dangerousness with-
out a pending criminal charge. And they cannot answer the question of whether 
the constitutional criteria for preventive restraint are more relaxed for defend-
ants than for others. 
b. Salerno and Civil Commitment 
United States v. Salerno might also seem to authorize special standards for 
preventive restraint of defendants. Salerno is the only Supreme Court case that 
squarely addresses pretrial preventive restraint.139 As discussed above, Salerno 
rejected a facial constitutional challenge to the federal preventive detention re-
gime.140 It held that neither due process nor the Excessive Bail Clause categori-
cally prohibits pretrial detention for general dangerousness.141 One might infer 
that, in authorizing preventive detention of defendants, the Court implicitly held 
that defendants are diﬀerent than non-defendants, even if they pose the same 
degree of crime risk. 
Yet nothing in Salerno compels the conclusion that the state has broader au-
thority to preventively detain defendants than non-defendants who are equally 
dangerous. The most basic reason is that the Court did not consider this com-
parison. The opinion does not address it. 
The Salerno Court’s reasoning, moreover, is not speciﬁc to the pretrial 
sphere. The Court upheld the challenged detention regime on the basis of pure 
instrumentalist balancing. It reasoned that an individual’s right to liberty may 
“be subordinated to the greater needs of society” when “the government’s inter-
est is suﬃciently weighty,”142 and that “the Government’s regulatory interest in 
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s 
 
138. One of the Gerstein respondents was detained because he could not aﬀord to post bail; the 
other was “denied bail because one of the charges against him carried a potential life sentence.” 
Id. at 105. It is unclear why Manuel was detained. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 915 
(2017). 
139. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
140. See supra notes 57-80 and accompanying text. 
141. 481 U.S. at 741-55. 
142. Id. at 750. 
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liberty interest.”143 This form of logic is as applicable to non-defendants as it is 
to defendants.144 
The Court itself described its interest-balancing analysis as applying far be-
yond the pretrial system. It cited “the well-established authority of the govern-
ment, in special circumstances, to restrain individuals’ liberty prior to or even 
without criminal trial and conviction.”145 As examples of the latter situation, the 
Court cited the government’s power to detain enemy aliens, “individuals whom 
the government believes to be dangerous” in times of insurrection, “potentially 
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings,” and “mentally un-
stable individuals who present a danger to the public.”146 None of these examples 
involves pending criminal charges. And the Court presented these as a non-ex-
haustive list of situations in which the state’s interest in public safety could 
simply outweigh an individual’s right to liberty. This reasoning suggests that the 
state could detain anyone to prevent future crime if the projected crime were 
suﬃciently serious and likely to occur. At the very least, Salerno does not fore-
close that possibility. 
To bring the point full circle: If the state’s preventive authority is simply a 
matter of balancing the communal interest in safety against the private interest 
in liberty, the degree of risk that justiﬁes restraint should be constant for defend-
ants and non-defendants—unless defendants have a reduced liberty interest. 
Nothing in Salerno suggests that they do. 
It might nonetheless still seem that Salerno eﬀectively grants unique preven-
tive authority in the pretrial arena because the Court has elsewhere prohibited 
detention for dangerousness alone. In its civil commitment cases, the Court has 
limited detention to people who, because of a mental disorder, “are unable to con-
trol their dangerousness.”147 The absence of this lack-of-control criterion in Sa-
lerno, the argument goes, means that the rules for preventive restraint are laxer 
for defendants than for others. 
 
143. Id. at 748. 
144. Cf. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that “the government’s 
interest in preventing crime by anyone is legitimate and compelling” (citing United States v. 
Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 674 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Norris, J., dissenting))). 
145. 481 U.S. at 749 (emphasis added). 
146. Id. at 748-49 (citations omitted). 
147. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 
U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (emphasizing the “constitutional importance” of the control criterion); 
cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that substantive due process prohibited 
the continued conﬁnement of an insanity acquitee who remained dangerous but who no 
longer suﬀered from any mental disorder). 
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On closer analysis, however, it is not clear that the Court’s civil commitment 
cases actually do prohibit detention for dangerousness alone. To begin with, the 
lack-of-control criterion is a dubious one.148 More concretely, the Court’s rejec-
tion of conﬁnement for dangerousness in Foucha v. Louisiana did not rest on a 
lack-of-control criterion at all.149 Rather, the Court held that the continued con-
ﬁnement of Mr. Foucha (an insanity acquittee who was no longer mentally dis-
ordered) violated substantive due process because the detention regime was not 
adequately tailored to its public-safety goals. The majority reached this conclu-
sion by comparing the Louisiana regime against the pretrial regime upheld in 
Salerno.150 Whereas detention pursuant to the Salerno regime was “strictly lim-
ited in duration,”151 Mr. Foucha was subject to “indeﬁnite” commitment.152 And 
whereas the Salerno regime included both substantive and procedural mecha-
nisms to limit detention to the acutely dangerous, the Louisiana regime did 
not.153 Justice O’Connor, who provided the crucial ﬁ�h vote in Foucha, speciﬁ-
cally noted that the Court’s holding did not foreclose more careful eﬀorts at de-
tention for dangerousness.154 
 
148. It is o�en impossible to distinguish between someone who cannot control her impulses and 
someone who does not. The Court itself acknowledged this in Kansas v. Crane. 534 U.S. at 412 
(“The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper 
than that between twilight and dusk.” (quoting the American Psychiatric Association, State-
ment on the Insanity Defense 11 (1982), reprinted in G. MELTON, J. PETRILA, N. POYTHRESS, & 
C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 200 (2d ed. 1997))). The Court 
therefore clariﬁed that a civil commitment regime need not require proof “of total or com-
plete lack of control. . . . It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious diﬃculty in 
controlling behavior.” Id. at 411-13. But most situations where a person poses demonstrable 
danger will entail evidence of “serious diﬃculty in controlling behavior.” Id. at 413. 
149. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
150. Id. at 80-83. 
151. Id. at 81 (“[T]he duration of conﬁnement under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) was strictly 
limited . . . .”); id. at 82 (“It was emphasized in Salerno that the detention we found constitu-
tionally permissible was strictly limited in duration.” (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (1987) 
(“The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing . . . , and the maximum length of 
pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.”))). 
152. Id. at 82 (“Here, in contrast, the State asserts that . . . [Foucha] may be held indeﬁnitely.”); id. 
at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court suggests—and the concurrence states explic-
itly—that the constitutional ﬂaw with this scheme is not that it provides for the conﬁnement 
of sane insanity acquittees, but that it (allegedly) provides for their ‘indeﬁnite’ conﬁnement 
in a mental facility.”). 
153. Id. at 81 (“Unlike the sharply focused scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of con-
ﬁnement is not carefully limited.”); id. at 81-84 (comparing Salerno and Louisiana regimes). 
154. Id. at 87 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I do not understand the Court to hold that Louisiana 
may never conﬁne dangerous insanity acquittees a�er they regain mental health.”); id. (opin-
ing that such conﬁnement might be permissible if “the nature and duration of detention were 
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Foucha thus strongly supports the conclusion that the reason the Court au-
thorized detention for dangerousness in Salerno was simply that the detention 
regime at issue was “carefully limited.”155 It was not because defendants are a 
special case. 
2. Pretrial Search Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing pretrial 
searches might also seem to authorize special infringements on defendants’ lib-
erty and privacy. The Court has held that during and subsequent to a lawful ar-
rest the state can invade a person’s privacy in ways that it otherwise could not. 
Without a warrant, police can search an arrestee’s person156 and o�en her car as 
well,157 conduct a protective sweep of a home where an arrest is made,158 compel 
 
tailored to reﬂect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing danger-
ousness.”). 
155. Id. at 84. 
156. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“[I]n the case of a lawful custo-
dial arrest a full search of the person is . . . a ‘reasonable’ search under [the Fourth] Amend-
ment.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“[I]t is reasonable for the arresting 
oﬃcer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons . . . .”). 
157. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits such 
searches “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the 
time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the oﬀense of 
arrest”). 
158. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (“The Fourth Amendment permits a properly lim-
ited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching oﬃcer pos-
sesses a reasonable belief . . . that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger 
to those on the arrest scene.”). 
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an arrestee to answer questions about her identity,159 inventory her belong-
ings,160 extract her DNA for analysis,161 and subject her to other radical depriva-
tions of personal privacy, including strip searches, if she is booked into jail.162 
This case law might seem to suggest that arrestees and defendants have uni-
formly reduced privacy rights, and therefore a lesser right against those preven-
tive restraints that are likely to be classiﬁed as searches (like GPS monitoring). 
Furthermore, if defendants have uniformly reduced privacy rights, they might 
also have uniformly reduced liberty interests, and therefore a lesser right against 
preventive restraints likely to be classiﬁed as seizures. 
Two recent cases appear to support this reduced-privacy-rights view. In both 
Maryland v. King and Riley v. California, the Court stated explicitly that arrestees 
have “diminished expectations of privacy.”163 In King, which upheld the warrant-
less collection of DNA from arrestees, the Court relied in part on these dimin-
ished expectations to waive the normal Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
and deploy the freewheeling “reasonableness” analysis that it has applied to 
searches of probationers and parolees.164 
The King Court’s reliance on arrestees’ “diminished expectations of privacy” 
might imply that pretrial defendants share the status of children, public-school 
 
159. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004) (holding that, in general, 
“[a]nswering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insigniﬁcant in the scheme of 
things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances”). 
160. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987) (“We are asked to decide whether the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the State from proving [the criminal] charges with the evidence 
discovered during the inventory search of respondent’s van. We hold that it does not.”); 
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (holding that “once an accused has been 
lawfully arrested and is in custody, the eﬀects in his possession at the place of detention that 
were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may lawfully be searched and seized 
without a warrant”). 
161. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (holding that “taking and analyzing a cheek 
swab of the arrestee’s DNA is . . . a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment”). 
162. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012) (holding that cer-
tain search procedures, which included strip searches, were constitutionally reasonable); Bell 
v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding the constitutionality of strip searches of 
inmates); Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803 (“[S]earches and seizures that could be made on the spot 
at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of 
detention.”). 
163. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (quoting King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969, 1979); King, 
133 S. Ct. at 1969, 1979 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)). 
164. 133 S. Ct. at 1969-70; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850-57 (2006) (upholding a 
warrantless search of a parolee’s person); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2001) 
(upholding a warrantless search of a probationer’s home). 
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students, government employees, probationers, parolees, and detainees—
groups that the Court has held to have broadly diminished expectations of pri-
vacy.165 For these groups, Fourth Amendment analysis has a diﬀerent starting 
point. The government need not meet the standards it normally must meet to 
justify a warrantless search, because these groups cannot assert the same right to 
privacy in the ﬁrst place.166 King suggests that the status of being a defendant 
aﬀects Fourth Amendment analysis in much the same way.167 
There are good reasons, however, to reject that reading of King. First, the 
rationales justifying the limited privacy rights of other groups do not apply to 
pretrial defendants. And second, while the Court has yet to directly confront the 
question of whether a pending charge aﬀects the structure of Fourth Amend-
ment analysis,168 its jurisprudence already suggests a negative answer. 
 
165. See, e.g., Samson, 547 U.S. at 850-57 (discussing parolees); Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-22 (dis-
cussing probationers); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-56 (1995) (discuss-
ing public-school students); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (discussing juveniles); 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 (discussing detainees); see also Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin 
Stein, Redeﬁning What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 
349 (2016) (discussing cases where the Court justiﬁed “suspicion-based or suspicionless” 
searches of people in certain circumstances “primarily by arguing that people in schools, pris-
ons, and government workplaces have reduced expectations of privacy”). 
166. See sources cited supra note 165. 
167. 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (“The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody 
‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’”) (quoting and citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 557); id. at 
1979 (asserting that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry “considers” the “dimin-
ished expectations of privacy of the arrestee”). 
168. Nor has it received much attention from scholars or lower courts. The Ninth Circuit has con-
fronted the question but without much clarity. Compare United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 
872-74 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[p]eople released pending trial, [in] contrast [to proba-
tioners], have suﬀered no judicial abridgment of their constitutional rights,” and thus their 
“privacy and liberty interests [a]re far greater than a probationer’s”) with Scott, 450 F.3d at 885 
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (“Scott’s reasonable expectation of privacy may be somewhat greater 
than that of a probationer, parolee, or pre-sentence releasee, but it is less than that of an ‘or-
dinary citizen.’”). Only one academic work squarely addresses this point. See Andrew J. Smith, 
Note, Unconstitutional Conditional Release: A Pyrrhic Victory for Arrestees’ Privacy Rights Under 
United States v. Scott, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2365, 2389 (2007) (“The lack of a clear deﬁni-
tion of a pretrial arrestee’s status is a lacuna in criminal law that must be ﬁlled.”). The Court 
has established that detainees’ rights are necessarily limited by virtue of being detained. Bell, 
441 U.S. at 546. At the same time, pretrial detainees retain some rights that convicted detainees 
do not. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) (“[P]retrial detainees (unlike 
convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all . . . .”). 
dangerous defendants 
529 
The Court’s reasons for asserting a priori limitations on the privacy rights of 
certain groups are not always clear, but one core idea is that the state bears cus-
todial responsibility for members of these groups.169 This custodial rationale ap-
plies most cleanly to people in government detention centers, psychiatric hospi-
tals, schools, government workplaces, and prisons.170 It might also apply, albeit 
less plainly, to children in delinquency proceedings, as well as to parolees and 
probationers.171 With respect to the latter two groups, the Court has further in-
timated that people still serving a sentence “on a continuum of possible punish-
ments” have limited rights because a reduction in rights status is part of the pun-
ishment deserved.172 
Neither the custodial rationale nor the punishment rationale applies to pre-
trial defendants—at least not for purposes of determining when preventive re-
straint is justiﬁed. The punishment rationale is obviously inapt because pretrial 
defendants have not been convicted. Although the custody rationale may kick in 
a�er pretrial restraints have been lawfully imposed, it is inapposite when the 
question is whether restraint is justiﬁed in the ﬁrst place. 
The Court’s pretrial search jurisprudence itself, moreover, contradicts the 
notion that defendants have diminished rights against state intrusion simply be-
cause they are facing criminal charges. Rather, a limiting principle uniﬁes the 
doctrine: only the demands of the adjudicative process can justify special in-
fringements of defendants’ privacy. The Court itself has not been clear on this 
point, but the principle explains the outcomes of its cases. The Court has upheld 
those warrantless pretrial intrusions that it deems essential to the safe and eﬀec-
tive administration of criminal proceedings. Such intrusions include those nec-
essary to ensure safety on the scene of arrest,173 preserve evidence of the crime 
 
169. See Friedman & Stein, supra note 165, at 349-53. 
170. Id. 
171. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“[Children] are assumed to be subject to the 
control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens 
patriae.”). The quasi-custody rationale is more attenuated for people serving noncustodial 
sentences, but still plausible if release on probation or parole is a privilege the state grants in 
lieu of lawful detention, rather than a right. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 
(1972) (“The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on 
the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.”). 
172. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (“[B]y virtue of their status alone, 
probationers ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,”’ justifying 
the ‘impos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions that deprive the oﬀender of some freedoms en-
joyed by law-abiding citizens.’” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112, 119 (2001))). 
173. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
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from imminent destruction,174 ensure accountability for impounded posses-
sions,175 safely manage jail facilities,176 and accurately identify defendants.177 By 
contrast, the Court has rejected warrantless pretrial intrusions not necessary to 
ensure the safety and integrity of criminal proceedings.178 
On this reading of the Court’s pretrial search jurisprudence, defendants re-
tain the same right to privacy as anyone else. But, because defendants are the 
subjects of criminal prosecution, their privacy rights must sometimes yield to 
the needs of the adjudicative process. For that reason, the outcome of Fourth 
Amendment analysis might diﬀer, in this limited respect, for defendants and 
non-defendants. But the justiﬁcation for any special limitations on defendants’ 
privacy is that the state’s heightened needs during the pretrial process demand 
such limitations, not that defendants have lesser a priori rights. 
The familiar conceptual distinction between rights infringements and viola-
tions provides a helpful framework.179 A right is infringed “when the interests 
that give rise to it are harmed.”180 If the infringement is justiﬁed, however, there 
is no rights violation. “A violation is a wrongful or unjustiﬁed infringement.”181 
Using that vocabulary, any invasion of a defendant’s privacy infringes the de-
fendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to exactly the same extent as it would in-
fringe a non-defendant’s. But when the invasion is justiﬁed by the demands of 
the adjudicative process, it does not violate a defendant’s rights. It would violate 
 
174. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752. 
175. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987). 
176. Florence v. Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012); Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 547 
(1979). 
177. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013). 
178. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 344, 351 (holding that warrantless automobile searches violate the 
Fourth Amendment when not necessary to protect oﬃcer safety or preserve evidence of the 
crime of arrest); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1998) (rejecting warrantless search 
pursuant to citation, “where the concern for oﬃcer safety is not present to the same extent 
and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all”); Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 390-93 (1978) (holding warrantless search of murder defendant’s home that was 
not “justiﬁed by any emergency threatening life or limb” to violate the Fourth Amendment); 
id. at 391 (“It is one thing to say that one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened 
right of privacy in his person. It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened right of 
privacy in his entire house.” (citations omitted)). 
179. The distinction is usually credited to Judith Jarvis Thomson. See, e.g., JUDITH JARVIS THOM-
SON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 47 (exploring the distinction between permissible and impermissible killing). 
180. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justiﬁcation, 118 ETHICS 258, 272 (2008). 
181. Id. at 273. 
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the non-defendant’s rights, because it would lack justiﬁcation. Certain rights in-
fringements that would violate non-defendants’ rights are thus permissible for 
defendants. But this is not because defendants have lesser Fourth Amendment 
rights than other people to begin with. Rather, it is because the demands of the 
adjudicative process justify some special infringements of the Fourth Amend-
ment rights we all share. 
Despite their talk of diminished expectations, both King and Riley ultimately 
support the principle that only the demands of the adjudicative process justify 
special infringements of defendants’ privacy. In order to uphold the challenged 
DNA collection regime, the King majority went to great lengths to cast it as nec-
essary to guarantee the accurate identiﬁcation of arrestees.182 Conversely, in Ri-
ley, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search 
of arrestees’ cell phones that are not necessary to protect the safety and integrity 
of ongoing proceedings.183 
The majority opinion in King rested on the premise that the warrantless 
DNA collection at issue was reasonable, and thus constitutional, because of the 
state’s need to correctly identify arrestees. While Justice Kennedy spent four par-
agraphs discussing arrestees’ privacy expectations and the minimal intrusiveness 
of a buccal swab, he spent twenty-one arguing that the Maryland DNA Collec-
tion Act served “the need for law enforcement oﬃcers in a safe and accurate way 
to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into cus-
tody.”184 Such identiﬁcation is important, he explained, not only for basic ad-
ministrative purposes, but also to determine whether the accused poses special 
risks to custodial staﬀ (if he is detained) and whether he is likely to abscond or 
commit pretrial crime (if released).185 “In sum,” Justice Kennedy concluded, 
“there can be little reason to question” the government’s legitimate interest in 
identiﬁcation, and DNA collection is “no more than an extension of methods of 
identiﬁcation long used in dealing with persons under arrest.”186 
 
182. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970-77. 
183. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492-94 (2014) (identifying three permissible purposes: 
learning of imminent threats, obtaining evidence of the crime charged, and preventing its 
destruction). 
184. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970; see also id. at 1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court alludes at several 
points to the fact that King was an arrestee . . . . But the Court does not really rest on this 
principle, and for good reason . . . . Sensing (correctly) that it needs more, the Court elabo-
rates at length the ways that the search here served the special purpose of ‘identifying’ King.”  
(footnote omitted)). 
185. Id. at 1971-74. 
186. Id. at 1977 (quoting United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1932)). 
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This premise was patently false, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent,187 and as 
many commentators have noted since.188 Certainly the state has a strong interest 
in identifying arrestees, but DNA collection does nothing to advance that inter-
est. The obvious purpose of Maryland’s collection regime was, instead, to com-
pile evidence that might prove useful in solving unrelated crimes.189 
But the Court’s contortions are revealing. Why would it go to such lengths 
to construct its decision around the state’s need for accurate identiﬁcation? The 
answer leads back to the unifying principle. If the Court had acknowledged the 
real purpose of the DNA collection regime, it would have run up against the rule 
that “suspicionless searches are never allowed if their principal end is ordinary 
crime-solving.”190 It would then have had three alternatives: (1) roll back the rule 
against suspicionless investigatory searches, (2) hold that the rule exempts de-
fendants, or (3) hold the DNA searches unconstitutional. The Court’s tortured 
eﬀorts to avoid this choice suggest that it was unwilling to take any of these three 
paths. 
In other words, the King Court’s identiﬁcation rationale may “tax[] the cre-
dulity of the credulous,”191 but it reﬂects the Court’s refusal to hold that an ar-
restee, simply by virtue of having been arrested, becomes subject to warrantless 
searches unrelated to his prosecution. As Justice Scalia asked and answered: 
“Why not just come out and say that any suspicionless search of an arrestee is 
allowed if it will be useful to solve crimes? The Court does not say that because 
most Members of the Court do not believe it.”192 The Court relied on the identi-
ﬁcation rationale because some procedural-needs rationale was necessary to up-
hold the search.193 
Riley, on the other hand, was a case without a procedural-needs ﬁg leaf. In 
each of two cases consolidated before the Court, law enforcement oﬃcers had 
searched an arrestee’s cell phone without a warrant.194 The Court held that these 
 
187. Id. at 1980-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1986 (“[I]t is safe to say that if the Court’s iden-
tiﬁcation theory is not wrong, there is no such thing as error.”). 
188. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 274 (2017) (“The 
decision in King is built on a lie.”). 
189. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1982-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 1982. 
191. Id. at 1980. 
192. Id. at 1982 n.1. 
193. This is true notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s assertion that the Court’s “special needs 
cases . . . do not have a direct bearing on the issues presented in this case.” Id. at 1978 (majority 
opinion). 
194. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480-82 (2014). 
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warrantless searches violated the Fourth Amendment. As in King, the Court in-
voked arrestees’ allegedly diminished expectations of privacy. But the holding 
centrally relied on the Court’s conclusion that the two risks that justify warrant-
less searches incident to arrest—“harm to oﬃcers and destruction of evidence”—
do not necessitate immediate searches of cell phones.195 Because such searches 
are not justiﬁed by the needs of the adjudicative process, they are impermissible. 
King and Riley thus aﬃrm the unifying principle that the constitutionality of 
a warrantless pretrial search turns on whether it is necessary to ensure the integ-
rity of the ongoing proceeding. On this interpretation, the Court’s “diminished 
expectations of privacy” language is a distraction. An arrestee’s expectations of 
privacy “necessarily are of a diminished scope,” because of the special needs of the 
adjudicative process.196 If you are arrested, you expect oﬃcers to disarm you, 
booking personnel to extract identifying information, and jail personnel to in-
ventory your belongings—because these intrusions are necessary for the system 
to work. But it is that necessity that justiﬁes the intrusions, rather than your 
subjective expectations.197 The Court would clarify matters by recognizing as 
much.198 
If this interpretation is correct, the Court’s pretrial search doctrine does pro-
vide special authority for pretrial restraint to prevent ﬂight, harm to witnesses, 
or other obstructions of justice—but it does not provide special authority for re-
straint to prevent unrelated future crime. In some cases, monitoring or restraint 
may be required to prevent obstructive harms. But lawful arrest does not itself 
authorize invasions of privacy for other purposes.199 And preventing unrelated 
 
195. Id. at 2484-85; see also id. at 2485-88 (analyzing oﬃcer-safety and loss-of-evidence concerns). 
196. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (internal alterations, citation, and quotation marks omitted). 
197. If subjective expectations could justify state action, the status quo would be self-justifying. 
Thus, the Court has acknowledged that the “reasonable expectations” prong of the traditional 
Katz Fourth Amendment analysis turns on what we think people should expect and tolerate, 
not what they actually do. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984) (“[C]on-
stitutional rights are generally not deﬁned by the subjective intent of those asserting the 
rights. The problems inherent in such a standard are self-evident.” (citation omitted)); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that subjective 
expectation must “be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”); Orin S. Kerr, 
Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 114-
15 (2015) (arguing that the subjective-expectations prong of the Katz test is a “phantom doc-
trine” that the Court should “formally abolish”). 
198. Cf. Kerr, supra note 197 (making a similar argument about the Katz test); Antoine McNamara, 
Note, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 209 (2007) (mak-
ing a similar argument with respect to penal contexts). 
199. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969) (“[W]e can see no reason why, simply 
because some interference with an individual’s privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully 
taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed . . . .”). 
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crime is not a special need of the adjudicative process.200 On the most coherent 
interpretation, then, the Supreme Court’s pretrial search doctrine does not sup-
port the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment standard for preventive re-
straint is diﬀerent for defendants than for anyone else.201 
B. No Clear Moral Distinction 
Those who grant that there is no doctrinal basis for permitting greater pre-
ventive restraint of defendants than of equally dangerous non-defendants might 
still assert a moral basis.202 There is, a�er all, an obvious diﬀerence between the 
two groups: defendants have been charged with a crime. A few scholars have 
suggested that a pending charge supported by probable cause constitutes an ad-
equate “moral predicate” for special restraint.203 One might also argue that the 
state is in a diﬀerent moral position vis-à-vis a defendant than others who are 
equally dangerous, because it has already taken the defendant into custody. Re-
leasing a person who subsequently commits a crime seems like an act, whereas 
failing to detain a person who subsequently commits a crime seems like an omis-
sion. The following subsections evaluate each of these two potential moral dis-
tinctions. 
1. “Moral Predicate” Theories 
From the outset, it is important to distinguish between the evidentiary and 
moral signiﬁcance of a criminal charge. A charge may be powerful evidence of 
risk. It may be the case that, on average, people charged with recent criminal acts 
are more dangerous than people who are not, or that the people who pose the 
most acute, identiﬁable threat are those facing certain kinds of charges. Risk as-
 
200. Accord United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Crime prevention is a quin-
tessential general law enforcement purpose and therefore is the exact opposite of a special 
need.”). 
201. It is important to clarify that this is an argument about the doctrinal rule, not the Court’s 
application of it. The Court has found intrusions to be necessary to the adjudicative process 
that patently are not—most obviously, the DNA search in King. Such decisions have had the 
eﬀect of limiting defendants’ liberty and privacy far more than the administrative demands of 
the process require. It is the rule itself, however, that should govern future cases. 
202. I admittedly use the word “moral” here quite loosely, to denote normative arguments that 
invoke rights or duties (in contrast to the “practical,” or instrumentalist, arguments explored 
in Section II.C). In other words, this Section addresses arguments that sound in deontological 
ethics, and the next Section addresses arguments that sound in consequentialist ethics. 
203. Alschuler, supra note 130, at 533. 
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sessment purports to take this kind of evidence into account. A high-risk defend-
ant in the PSA study had an 8.6% chance of rearrest on a violent charge, given 
the fact and nature of his current charge.204 Beyond what statistical assessment 
can capture, the alleged facts in a particular case might suggest heightened risk 
relative to statistically similar peers. To be clear, nothing in the Article contests 
the state’s authority to consider the evidentiary signiﬁcance of pending allega-
tions for purposes of a risk analysis.205 But the fact that a criminal charge may be 
powerful evidence of risk does not help to answer this Article’s core question, 
which is whether the threshold of risk at which restraint is justiﬁed is diﬀerent 
for defendants than for others. As mere evidence of risk, a criminal charge pro-
vides no basis for distinguishing between people who are equally risky.206 
A pending charge might also have moral signiﬁcance. The judicial determi-
nation of probable cause denotes that there is “probable cause to believe the sus-
pect has committed a crime.”207 And crimes, for the most part, entail volitional 
wrongful acts.208 So a charge supported by probable cause reﬂects some proba-
bility that the accused has committed a wrongful act for which she bears respon-
sibility. This probability of guilt carries moral weight. Especially if the charge is 
serious, it calls the accused’s moral standing into question. 
The fact that a criminal charge might have some moral signiﬁcance does not, 
however, automatically justify special deprivations of liberty imposed by the 
state. Proving that proposition would require additional work. The argument 
could take several forms. 
First, one could argue that at least some defendants deserve less protection 
against preventive interference than non-accused people by virtue of their prob-
able guilt. Following this line of argument, some might contend that it is intrin-
sically good—or at least not intrinsically bad—for defendants to suﬀer, given the 
 
204. LJAF, Results, supra note 16, at 3. 
205. On this point I part ways with Shima Baradaran Baughman, who has argued that “judges 
should not ‘weigh’ any of the evidence alleged against defendants before trial.” Shima Bara-
daran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 772 (2011). 
206. Accord Morse, supra note 32, at 119 n.15 (“The claim that the criminal charge is good evidence 
of dangerousness is an evidentiary argument rather than a principled reason to distinguish 
charged oﬀenders.”). 
207. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (holding that, a�er warrantless arrests, the Fourth 
Amendment requires a detached and neutral magistrate to determine that there is “probable 
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime”). 
208. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits punishment for status (as opposed to punishment for volitional acts)). 
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probability that they have committed blameworthy criminal acts.209 A related 
argument would be that defendants forfeit their right against preventive interfer-
ence.210 Albert Alschuler suggests something along these lines. He proposes that 
preventive detention may be justiﬁed when a court can conclude— “based on 
imperfect evidence that is also the best available—that a defendant has abused 
his freedom by committing a serious crime.”211 Alschuler’s formulation of this 
principle implies a moral judgment, but this kind of forfeiture could also operate 
as a strict liability regime.212 
Another argument, adapted from H.L.A. Hart’s vision of the criminal law, 
might be that our legal system simply makes preventive restraint one conse-
quence of a criminal charge.213 Hart argued that, in order to maximize both in-
dividual choice and public welfare, the law should prohibit the state from inter-
fering with individual liberty unless a person has chosen to break the law. In 
turn, the state can attach consequences to that choice. As long as people have 
adequate notice of the consequences of law-breaking and nonetheless choose to 
incur them, those consequences can fairly be enforced.214 Under this fair-conse-
quence theory, we might conceptualize pretrial preventive restraint as a conse-
quence voluntarily incurred. 
A ﬁnal variant of the moral-predicate argument, suggested by the work of 
R.A. Duﬀ (but notably rejected by Duﬀ himself), is that some defendants might 
owe a civic “duty of reassurance” that justiﬁes restraint to prevent non-case-related 
 
209. See Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIM-
INAL LAW 433, 437-38 (R.A. Duﬀ & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (describing ambiguities latent 
in the concept of desert, and identifying the “dominant view” among retributivists as the no-
tion that guilty people deserve to suﬀer); see also, e.g., Richard L. Lippke, Preventive Pre-Trial 
Detention Without Punishment, 20 RES PUBLICA 111, 122 (2014) (suggesting that preventive de-
tention may be justiﬁed if the state can demonstrate that there is “substantial evidence” of 
guilt on a serious charge); Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: Desert/Disease 
Jurisprudence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1124 (2011) (suggesting that pretrial detention “is 
justiﬁed by probable cause to believe that the accused has culpably committed a criminal of-
fense”). 
210. Cf. Christopher Heath Wellman, The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment, 122 ETHICS 371, 
371 (2012). 
211. Alschuler, supra note 130, at 557; id. at 511. 
212. Thanks to Mitch Berman for this point. I have previously—and incorrectly—asserted that any 
judgment of forfeiture necessarily entails a judgment of desert. See Sandra G. Mayson, Collat-
eral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 337 (2015) (“Only by 
blameworthy conduct can a person forfeit rights.”). 
213. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 23, 44 (2d ed. 2008) (describing criminal law as a “choosing system,” the “method of social 
control which maximizes individual freedom within the coercive framework of law”). 
214. Id. at 37. 
dangerous defendants 
537 
crime.215 On Duﬀ ’s view, each member of a polity owes the others a duty of “civic 
trust,” and therefore also owes them reassurance if her own civic trustworthiness 
is called into question.216 Duﬀ reasons that in some cases the law can justiﬁably 
command such reassurance, and that this logic might justify the restraint of de-
fendants who have demonstrated a propensity to abscond or to obstruct jus-
tice.217 The same argument might be deployed to justify pretrial restraint of dan-
gerous defendants. If the duty of reassurance is solely a function of apparent risk, 
then a defendant owes no greater duty than an equally dangerous non-defend-
ant. But if the duty arises from a person’s culpable choice to engage in behavior 
that demonstrates risk, then a defendant might have a greater duty of reassur-
ance than a non-defendant who poses an equal risk but is not accused of recent 
criminal conduct.218 
The central problem with each of these moral-predicate theories is that they 
justify pretrial deprivations of liberty by pointing to a defendant’s responsibility 
for the charged oﬀense. But to invoke a defendant’s guilt as justiﬁcation for pre-
trial restraint threatens fundamental due process values, which tend to run under 
the heading of the “presumption of innocence.” Defendants, a�er all, have only 
been accused. Many are not guilty. Fewer than seventy percent of felony arrests 
nationwide lead to conviction.219 And the protection of accused people against 
false condemnation and punishment is a core commitment of the criminal justice 
system. Although this due process objection is not unanswerable, it does repre-
sent a formidable challenge for moral-predicate theories. It warrants careful 
elaboration. 
First oﬀ—and contrary to intuition—the presumption of innocence itself 
does not precisely capture the due process objection. Rhetorically, the presump-
tion looms large. The Supreme Court, for instance, has mused that the presump-
tion of innocence “is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its en-
forcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”220 
The Court has also clariﬁed, however, that the presumption is only “a doctrine 
 
215. See Duﬀ, supra note 28, at 130. 
216. Id. at 122-23. 
217. Id. at 124-27. 
218. As noted above the line, Duﬀ himself rejects this line of argument, at least with respect to 
detention. He does not address how it might apply to non-custodial restraints. Id. at 127-29, 
131. 
219. Reaves, supra note 3, at 22. 
220. Coﬃn v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
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that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials.”221 It has no speciﬁc applica-
tion to pretrial defendants.222 Some scholars lament this characterization as un-
duly narrowing the presumption’s ambit.223 On the other hand, as Richard 
Lippke has explained, it is unclear exactly how the presumption of innocence 
could or should operate in the pretrial arena.224 
The due process objection is more precisely stated in terms of the values the 
presumption of innocence reﬂects. As the Supreme Court explained in In re Win-
ship,225 the presumption reﬂects a commitment to protect individuals against of-
ﬁcial condemnation unless their guilt has been ﬁrmly established.226 The stakes 
are high. An oﬃcial judgment of guilt is o�en life-altering, carrying the possi-
bility of conﬁnement and the certainty of stigma.227 “Accordingly, a society that 
values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a 
man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his 
guilt.”228 Due process demands this protection not just for criminal conviction, 
but also for adjudications of guilt in juvenile delinquency proceedings that trig-
ger (purportedly) non-punitive consequences only.229 
The central objection to the various moral-predicate theories, then, is that 
due process prohibits depriving a person of liberty on the basis of an oﬃcial 
judgment of guilt except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. More speciﬁcally, 
one might argue that any deprivation imposed by virtue of guilt should be clas-
siﬁed as punishment,230 and is therefore ﬂatly impermissible during the pretrial 
 
221. Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
222. Id. 
223. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 736-37 
(2011). 
224. RICHARD L. LIPPKE, TAMING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 129-54 (2016) (explaining the 
diﬃculties of applying the presumption in the pretrial context). 
225. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
226. Id. at 361-65. 
227. Id. at 363. In addition, “use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command 
the respect and conﬁdence of the community in applications of the criminal law.” Id. at 364. 
228. Id. at 363-64. 
229. Id. at 367. 
230. This argument rests on two premises. The ﬁrst is that oﬃcial condemnation is the deﬁning 
feature of state punishment. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanc-
tion . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justiﬁes its 
imposition.”); Mayson, supra note 212, at 318 & n.87 (proposing that “punishment is hard 
treatment inﬂicted as a putatively just consequence of blameworthy conduct” and collecting 
sources that support this view); Tribe, supra note 22, at 379 n.30 (“[I]t is the expression of 
community condemnation rather than any necessarily retributive purpose that characterizes a 
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period.231 Alternately, one might argue that due process prohibits pretrial depri-
vations by virtue of guilt even if they do not constitute punishment, because they 
involve oﬃcial condemnation and the loss of liberty. A�er all, probable cause 
does not provide suﬃcient basis for a judgment of guilt; probable cause “means 
less than evidence which would justify condemnation.”232 Either way, as Winship 
held, due process prohibits the state from subjecting a person “to the stigma of 
a ﬁnding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of institutional 
conﬁnement on proof insuﬃcient to convict him.”233 
This due process objection to moral-predicate theories is not unassailable. 
Winship dealt with ﬁnal determinations of guilt in delinquency proceedings, so 
it is not entirely clear that its holding extends to pretrial determinations of guilt 
for purposes of short-term restraint. Nor is it entirely clear that any deprivation 
imposed by virtue of guilt should be classiﬁed as punishment.234 Moreover, even 
 
particular disability as punishment.”). The second premise is that any oﬃcial judgment of 
guilt entails oﬃcial condemnation. If these two premises are true, it follows that any depriva-
tion imposed by virtue of guilt constitutes punishment, and cannot constitutionally be im-
posed before trial. In other work, I have argued for a punishment test along these lines. See 
Mayson, supra note 212, at 345-46 (proposing that courts classify a deprivation of liberty as 
punishment whenever the state “claims primary authorization from a judgment of culpabil-
ity,” and otherwise classify deprivations as regulatory). 
231. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) (noting that “pretrial detainees (un-
like convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all”); Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) 
(“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication 
of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”). 
232. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813); see also Harmon, supra note 124, at 
310 (2016) (noting that probable cause “is almost by deﬁnition not enough proof to establish 
blameworthiness”). The function of the probable cause determination is not to establish 
blameworthiness, but rather “to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences 
with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
176 (1949). 
233. Winship, 397 U.S. at 367; cf. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the Presumption of 
Innocence, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 505, 515, 523 (2014) (defending the right of states to restrain 
“culpable aggressors” who threaten future harm, but concluding that states should be required 
to prove the predicate criteria for culpability beyond a reasonable doubt). 
234. Perhaps a deprivation should not be classiﬁed as “punishment” unless it has a purpose to cen-
sure or cause suﬀering. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, The Justiﬁcation of Punishment, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 143 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (deﬁning 
punishment as inﬂiction of hard treatment “because of, and not despite” the suﬀering it will 
cause); Douglas Husak, Li�ing the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1173, 1189 (2011) (“[A] sanction is not a punishment without a purpose to deprive and 
censure.”). The Supreme Court, moreover, has not held that any deprivation imposed by vir-
tue of guilt constitutes punishment. According to current doctrine, a pretrial deprivation is 
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if current doctrine is a hurdle to moral-predicate models, the question at issue is 
normative: should the state have greater authority to preventively restrain de-
fendants than equally dangerous non-defendants? A moral-predicate proponent 
could intelligibly argue that probable guilt for a charged oﬀense constitutes a 
moral basis to treat a defendant diﬀerently than an equally dangerous non-de-
fendant, and that in the pretrial context (as opposed to the trial context), the 
stakes are not so high as to require that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt before it is invoked to justify special restraints. 
To advocate pretrial determinations of guilt at a less demanding standard of 
proof is no simple matter, however. The stakes may be as high in this context as 
in some delinquency proceedings or misdemeanor trials. The moral-predicate 
advocate might respond that we already permit pretrial deprivations on the basis 
of probable guilt: probable cause suﬃces for arrest. But this argument overlooks 
the fact that a probable-cause determination serves a diﬀerent function than the 
guilt determination that a moral-predicate model would require.235 
Even presuming that the probable guilt of a defendant could qualify as an 
independent moral justiﬁcation for preventive restraint, there remains the 
daunting task of specifying what kind of guilt determination should authorize 
what kind of restraint. What act, proven at what degree of conﬁdence, with what 
procedures, justiﬁes what restraint, and does it authorize restraint automatically or 
only if additional criteria are met? Each of these determinations is complex. Do all 
oﬀenses constitute moral predicates for preventive restraint, or just serious of-
fenses that entail signiﬁcant culpability? What standard of proof must the state 
meet to demonstrate guilt for the charged oﬀense in this context? Is defense 
counsel guaranteed, and what other procedural rights does the defense have to 
contest guilt? When guilt is suﬃciently established, what degree of restraint does 
each oﬀense trigger—are shopli�ing and murder equal moral predicates, or does 
 
“punishment” if it is inﬂicted with “punitive” intent, or if it is irrational or excessive as a reg-
ulatory measure. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473-74; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 
(1987); Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39. 
235. The guilt of the accused is not the direct justiﬁcation for arrest, or for other intrusions neces-
sary to the administration of criminal proceedings. The direct justiﬁcation for those intrusions 
is the state’s legitimate interest in prosecution, which hinges partly on the likelihood of con-
viction. In other words, some likelihood of demonstrable guilt justiﬁes the state in undertak-
ing criminal proceedings, which may require some restriction of the accused’s liberty. The 
probable-cause determination is addressed to the question of whether the evidence is ade-
quate to justify the state in pursuing prosecution. To invoke the content and strength of the 
evidence against the accused as practical justiﬁcation for prosecution (and the deprivations of 
liberty it entails) is one thing. To invoke the accused’s guilt as moral justiﬁcation for depriva-
tions to prevent unrelated future crime is quite another. What constitutes an appropriate evi-
dentiary standard for the former has no clear bearing on what constitutes an appropriate evi-
dentiary standard for the latter. 
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murder authorize greater restraint than shopli�ing even if the shopli�er is more 
dangerous?236 What other criteria must enter the calculus?237 No existing pre-
trial regime has addressed and resolved these questions.238 
No one, currently, is making a serious case for a moral-predicate regime. Any 
successful attempt to do so would require explaining why guilt justiﬁes preven-
tive restraint (i.e., defending a speciﬁc moral-predicate theory); rebutting the 
due process objection that any oﬃcial judgment of guilt carries special stigma, 
such that it should only be made with near-certainty; and elaborating an aﬃrm-
ative vision of a moral-predicate regime that grapples with speciﬁcs. Unless and 
until someone does those things, the Winship principle should govern: the state 
may not invoke a person’s guilt as moral justiﬁcation for depriving her of liberty 
unless it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.239 
2. The Causal-Responsibility Argument 
The second possible line of moral argument focuses not on the defendant, 
but on the state. The argument is that the state has a greater duty to restrain 
dangerous defendants than equally dangerous non-defendants. Ronald Allen 
 
236. This illustrates a limitation of the moral-predicate model. Some shopli�ers are more danger-
ous than some murderers. Presuming that shopli�ing is less of a moral predicate than murder, 
and authorizes less preventive restraint, the state must either forego eﬀective restraint of dan-
gerous shopli�ers or impose greater restraint than is warranted. See Darin Clearwater, “If the 
Cloak Doesn’t Fit, You Must Acquit”: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and the Problem 
of Coextensiveness, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 49 (2017); Robinson, supra note 39, at 1432 (arguing 
that “[s]egregation of the punishment and prevention functions oﬀers a superior alterna-
tive”). 
237. Kimberly Ferzan and Alec Walen, for instance, hold that culpability can eliminate a person’s 
right against preventive interference, but would also require the state to demonstrate that any 
restraint is reasonable and necessary to accomplish its preventive goals. See Ferzan, supra note 
123, at 143-45; Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a Foun-
dation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1240 (2011). 
238. Alschuler, supra note 130, at 559 (observing that, “[e]ven as supplemented by Gerstein, the 
[Bail Reform] Act authorizes imprisonment grounded almost entirely on a prediction of fu-
ture misconduct,” without a meaningful determination of probable guilt). 
239. Once again, this principle does not preclude the state from invoking a person’s riskiness as 
justiﬁcation for depriving her of liberty nor from considering the strength of pending allega-
tions in assessing that risk. What it prohibits is invoking guilt as an independent, or addi-
tional, justiﬁcation—unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in this Article 
contests the notion that a conviction can serve as a moral predicate for preventive restraint. See, 
e.g., Husak, supra note 234, at 1186-87 (arguing that the state can pursue incapacitative ends 
through punishment); Walen, supra note 237, at 1240 (arguing that “one element of a justiﬁed 
punishment can be the temporary loss of the normal immunity to [long-term preventive de-
tention]”). 
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and Larry Laudan take this position, reasoning that “citizens have a right to be 
protected from criminal victimization,” such that when the state has a dangerous 
defendant “in its custody,” it has a duty to continue to restrain him.240 If it re-
leases him instead, “then the state bears a direct responsibility for such harm as 
that individual wreaks.”241 
This might be termed the causal-responsibility argument. The state seems 
to do something by releasing a defendant who goes on to commit a crime.242 
When it foresees crimes by equally dangerous non-defendants but does not in-
tervene, on the other hand, it merely allows the crimes to happen. It is a founda-
tional, though contested, principle of moral philosophy “that people have a 
greater responsibility, in general, for what they do than for what they merely 
allow or fail to prevent.”243 And with this greater responsibility comes a height-
ened duty of prevention. 
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the state has the legal 
or moral authority to hold a defendant, such that release is a meaningful choice. 
This is what makes release seem like an “act,” something the state “does,” and for 
which it bears special responsibility. If the premise is wrong—if the state must 
release a defendant—then it bears no moral responsibility for release and events 
that follow. The premise (that the state has authority to hold the defendant) thus 
begs the relevant question, which is whether the state has such authority in the 
ﬁrst place. More speciﬁcally, it begs the question of why the state would have the 
authority to hold a defendant if it lacks authority to impose custody on an equally 
dangerous non-defendant. In other words, the causal-responsibility argument 
does not oﬀer a justiﬁcation for special state preventive authority in the pretrial 
arena. It is, instead, a conclusion that follows if the state has such authority. 
Dissecting the intuition behind the causal-responsibility view is nonetheless 
valuable. First, the causal-responsibility argument might reﬂect loss aversion. 
We think of defendants as already in custody, so release seems like an aﬃrmative 
action that requires justiﬁcation, whereas detention feels like maintenance of the 
 
240. Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
23, 39 (2010). 
241. Id. 
242. On this view, pretrial crime is akin to a “state-created danger.” See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 
F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have recognized that the Due Process Clause can impose 
an aﬃrmative duty to protect if the state’s own actions create the very danger that causes the 
plaintiﬀ ’s injury.”). 
243. Samuel Scheﬄer, Doing and Allowing, 114 ETHICS 214 (2004) (noting that some consequen-
tialists deny the doing/allowing distinction). 
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status quo.244 Accordingly, we are quick to blame the judicial oﬃcer who ordered 
release whenever it contributes to harm.245 But these are just psychological facts. 
They provide no normative justiﬁcation for the causal-responsibility view. 
A second, more promising intuition behind the causal-responsibility argu-
ment is that a defendant’s arrest puts the state on notice of his dangerousness.246 
The fact that gives rise to a special state duty of crime prevention is not merely 
that the defendant has already been taken into custody. Rather, it is the nature 
of arrest. 
To see this more clearly, imagine other custodial scenarios: a nurse is quar-
antined a�er working with Ebola patients; a recalcitrant witness is detained to 
compel her testimony; a jury member is sequestered during deliberations. Im-
agine that all are released, and each commits a domestic assault the following 
week. Assuming that neither the nurse, witness, nor juror appeared unduly dan-
gerous while they were in custody, the fact that the state recently released them 
does not make it responsible for their crimes. Nor can the state be blamed for 
releasing them; it had no authority (legal or moral) to do otherwise. These sce-
narios illustrate the shallowness of the act-omission distinction. The state 
“acted” by releasing each person who subsequently committed a crime, and yet 
this act alone carries no particular moral signiﬁcance. 
The only diﬀerence in the pretrial context is the nature of the initial custody. 
The reason for the state’s apparent causal responsibility for pretrial crime, then, 
is not the fact of release per se (the “act”), but rather the fact that arrest is thought 
to put the state on notice of a person likely to commit future crimes. On this 
view, defendants are diﬀerent from equally dangerous non-defendants because 
they represent foreseeable harm. Given the state’s general duty to prevent crime, 
the argument goes, it must take the opportunity to intervene once put on notice. 
Squandering such an opportunity is tantamount to a breach of duty.247 A more 
 
244. See S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3329-30. The Senate 
Report for the Bail Reform Act of 1984 also referred to, for example, “the problem of how to 
change current bail laws to provide appropriate authority to deal with dangerous defendants 
seeking release,” as if pretrial liberty were a privilege rather than the default. Id. at 6, as reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189 (emphasis added). 
245. See Wiseman, supra note 66, at 426-32 (explaining this phenomenon as part of “the principal-
agent problem in bail determinations”). 
246. Many thanks to Paul Heaton, Michael Cahill, and Youngjae Lee for raising this argument. 
247. This reasoning aligns with tort-law doctrines that impose a duty on certain actors, like land-
lords or therapists, to minimize third-party crime risk when they have notice of likely crime 
and a unique opportunity to prevent it. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 
439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that a landlord’s duty of care includes taking steps 
“to minimize the predictable risk to his tenants” from third-party crime, where he had notice 
of the risk and “the exclusive power to take preventive action”); Tarasoﬀ v. Regents of the 
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nuanced version of the causal-responsibility argument might thus run as fol-
lows: when arrest puts the state on notice of future crime risk, the state has a 
duty to prevent the future crime, and is morally responsible for failing to do so. 
While not implausible, this notice-and-opportunity variant on the causal-
responsibility argument still does not answer the question this Article sets out to 
resolve. Presume that it is correct, such that the state does have a heightened duty 
to prevent crime by defendants. The question is whether the state has authority 
to restrain a defendant if it could not permissibly restrain an equally dangerous 
person at large. And a heightened duty of crime prevention does not automati-
cally translate into authority to restrain. The state always has some general duty 
to prevent crime, a�er all, and that general background duty does not automat-
ically confer authority to preventively restrain non-accused people. If that is be-
cause pure preventive restraint is categorically morally prohibited, a heightened 
duty of crime prevention still does not overcome the moral prohibition.248 A 
heightened duty might require the state to take other preventive measures, like 
providing supportive services that reduce the likelihood the defendant will turn 
to crime, minimizing the opportunities for crime, or enhancing deterrent penal-
ties to discourage crime. But a heightened duty to prevent crime cannot over-
come a moral prohibition on a particular mechanism of prevention. 
If, on the other hand, the reason the state cannot permissibly restrain the 
equally dangerous non-defendant ﬂows instead from an instrumentalist calculus 
(i.e., the costs of such restraint would outweigh its beneﬁts), the notice-and-
opportunity argument has much greater traction. Notice of risk and an immedi-
ate opportunity for prevention might reduce the costs of pretrial restraint suﬃ-
ciently to make it cost-justiﬁed. In an instrumentalist world, that would confer 
the authority to restrain defendants. And if the state has authority to restrain, a 
heightened duty might require it to do so. 
That is to say, the notice-and-opportunity variant on the causal-responsibil-
ity argument is really an instrumentalist argument. It is not an independent 
moral argument. It is much more plausible than the shallow version of the 
causal-responsibility (act-omission) argument we ﬁrst considered. But it de-
pends on a set of instrumentalist conclusions. Speciﬁcally, the state may have 
both the authority and the duty to restrain defendants at lower thresholds of risk 
than non-defendants, if and only if (a) the permissibility of restraint turns on a 
 
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (holding that therapists may have a duty of care to 
warn likely victims of foreseeable violence by their patients). 
248. Cf. Youngjae Lee, Deontology, Political Morality, and the State, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 385 (2011) 
(arguing that core constraints on state punishment are categorical constraints imposed to 
limit the power of oﬃcial blame, and thus not subject to instrumentalist adjustment). 
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practical calculus, and (b) that calculus diﬀers for defendants and non-defend-
ants who pose equal risk. Assuming (a), the next Section considers whether (b) 
is true.249 
C. No Clear Practical Distinction 
There is a bevy of practical diﬀerences between defendants and equally dan-
gerous non-defendants that might seem relevant to decision-making about pre-
ventive restraint. In cost-beneﬁt terms,250 these diﬀerences make the preventive 
restraint of defendants seem less costly. On closer analysis, however, the cost 
diﬀerential is not so apparent. The discussion that follows is admittedly specu-
lative, both because the costs and beneﬁts of pretrial preventive restraint are in-
completely understood and because, at present, there is no analogous regime for 
non-defendants that would oﬀer a direct comparison. That said, the analysis 
suggests that there is no clear cost diﬀerence between the preventive restraint of 
defendants and non-defendants who pose equal risk. 
1. Beneﬁts and Costs of Preventive Restraint 
The central beneﬁt of a preventive regime is that it averts harm. To quantify 
this beneﬁt, it is necessary to specify the likelihood and severity of the harms it 
 
249. Stephen Schulhofer has suggested a diﬀerent heightened-duty argument. He posits that the 
pretrial phase might represent a “gap” where the threat of punishment is inadequate to pre-
vent crime, such that the state has special authority (and responsibility) to engage in preven-
tive restraint. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 69, 93-94 (1996). It is questionable, however, whether the pretrial phase rep-
resents such a gap. Schulhofer notes that some defendants are unlikely to be deterred by the 
threat of additional punishment from committing pretrial crime. Id. at 86-87. Relatedly, 
Christopher Slobogin has advocated for the notion of “undeterrability” to serve as a criterion 
for preventive detention. Slobogin, supra note 123, at 48 (“The undeterrability criterion better 
describes the ‘gap’ population that cannot be addressed by the criminal law—those people 
who are impervious to its dictates.”). But there are many people for whom deterrence is inef-
fective, and Schulhofer does not explain why we should treat defendants diﬀerently from an-
yone else who is equally unlikely to heed the threat. In the end, he seems to conclude that the 
pretrial phase does not represent a “gap” in the competence of criminal-law deterrence at all. 
See Schulhofer, supra, at 96 (concluding that “[i]n the absence of mental illness suﬃciently 
serious to preclude criminal responsibility,” predictive conﬁnement is impermissible). 
250. For a defense of short-term pretrial preventive detention on cost-beneﬁt grounds, see Walen, 
supra note 237, at 1238 (arguing that some defendants “may justiﬁably be detained for the sake 
of the general welfare because the burden on them is not too great, and we may ask reasonably 
small sacriﬁces of people for the sake of the general welfare”). 
the yale law journal 127:490  2018 
546 
prevents. Even then, the nature of this beneﬁt—the averted costs of crime—re-
mains extremely complex.251 The most immediate costs of crime are borne by 
the victim.252 These individual costs may be physical, psychological, or ﬁnan-
cial.253 Crime also has broader social costs, including the costs of treating vic-
tims; the costs of identifying, prosecuting, and punishing the perpetrator; the 
costs of aggravated fear, increased prevention measures, and disinvestment in 
crime-ridden neighborhoods; and the costs to the perpetrator’s community if he 
is incarcerated.254 Finally, the failure to prevent crime may cost the state political 
legitimacy, especially if it is perceived as indiﬀerent to crime in already-margin-
alized communities.255 The beneﬁt of a preventive regime depends on the degree 
to which it averts these harms. 
On the other side of the ledger, the costs of preventive restraint are equally 
complex.256 The most profound cost is, of course, the loss of liberty to the person 
restrained, and its cascading social and economic eﬀects.257 Then there are the 
 
251. There is a sizable economic literature that has endeavored, with increasing sophistication, to 
quantify these costs. See Aaron Chalﬁn, Economic Costs of Crime, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 543, 544-48 (Wesley G. Jennings ed., 2016) (describing alternate 
methodologies to quantify “external” and “social” costs of crime and surveying existing cost 
estimates). 
252. In the economics literature, these are called “external costs.” Id. at 544-45. 
253. Many crimes also have serious costs for the perpetrator. It is debatable whether these, if de-
served, ought to count in the calculus. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 180, at 269-70 (explaining 
the retributivist position that “the state of aﬀairs in which oﬀenders experience the suﬀering 
they deserve is not bad”). 
254. Chalﬁn, supra note 251, at 545. 
255. Cf. Harmon, supra note 35, at 895 (noting that the “potential beneﬁts of criminal justice pol-
icy” include “reducing fear, improving citizen satisfaction, decreasing perceived disorder, and 
promoting legal compliance and cooperation with law enforcement”). 
256. As Rachel Harmon has noted, however, empirical analysis “of the costs of criminal justice pol-
icy continues to be anemic.” Id. 
257. Detention, in particular, may entail serious physical, psychological, and reputational harm. 
See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972) (cataloguing the costs of detention to 
detainees); Appleman, supra note 66, at 1318-21 (describing abysmal jail conditions, as well 
as the eﬀects of pretrial detention on families and on a defendant’s case); Shima Baradaran 
Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (explaining that detention 
may entail “loss of freedom, income, and housing; childcare costs; loss and the� of property; 
strain on intimate relationships;” and “potential violent or sexual assault”). The sole recent 
attempt to quantify this loss of liberty is David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and 
the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 
751, 766 tbl.7 (2011), which interprets bail-posting behavior as revealing defendants’ valuation 
of their freedom, and concludes that average valuation was $1,050 for 90 days of liberty. But 
see David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Beneﬁt Approach to Incarceration, 98 
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ﬁnancial costs of operating a preventive regime and the lost tax revenue from the 
persons it keeps from working.258 Preventive detention, furthermore, carries its 
own set of social costs, including unintended criminogenic eﬀects,259 the exacer-
bation of race and class inequalities,260 and the psychological and relational costs 
of branding certain people or groups as dangers to the broader community. 
Lastly, preventive restraint entails a number of risks that any cost-beneﬁt calcu-
lation should take into account, such as the possibility that prevention will serve 
as a veneer for punishment,261 that the preventive regime will expand without 
good cause,262 or that the use of predictive instruments will distort decision-
making.263 
 
IOWA L. REV. 905, 950 n.182 (2013) (acknowledging that this estimate is “likely to be a lower 
bound, since some oﬀenders are likely credit constrained”). 
258. See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 2 (2017) (cal-
culating the total annual cost of pretrial jail beds to be $14 billion in the time period assessed). 
259. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRE-
TRIAL DETENTION 4 (2013) (ﬁnding that longer pretrial detention increases the likelihood of 
future crime); Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 4, at 767 (ﬁnding that pretrial deten-
tion of misdemeanor defendants substantially increases the likelihood of a new criminal 
charge within eighteen months). 
260. See Angwin et al., supra note 19; Harcourt, supra note 19, at 240 (“[R]elying on prediction 
instruments to reduce mass incarceration will surely aggravate what is already an unacceptable 
racial disproportionality in our prisons.”); Starr, supra note 19, at 836-37 (noting that the use 
of “demographic, socioeconomic, and family- and neighborhood-related characteristics” as 
indicators of risk will “further demographically concentrate” the impact of mass incarcera-
tion). 
261. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 380 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that if a state 
can avoid criminal procedural protections by deeming a proceeding “civil,” then “nothing 
would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of ‘dangerous person’ statutes to shadow 
its criminal code”); cf. Allen & Laudan, supra note 39, at 796 n.47 (“The Supreme Court o�en 
pretends that jail time served while on bail is not ‘punishment’ but simply community pro-
tection; that distinction in this context seems strained at best.”). 
262. See Morse, supra note 209, at 1085 (“The incentive structure predisposes decisionmakers in 
cases involving danger to overpredict and thus to imprison or hospitalize longer than is nec-
essary.”). 
263. Sonja Starr has shown that the use of an actuarial risk instrument may lead decisionmakers 
to weigh risk more heavily than they otherwise would. Starr, supra note 19, at 867-70 (de-
scribing a classroom experiment demonstrating this eﬀect); see also HARCOURT, AGAINST PRE-
DICTION, supra note 19, at 31-34, 173-92 (arguing that use of predictive instruments can distort 
“conceptions of justice”). Relatedly, risk-based decision-making may be particularly suscepti-
ble to framing eﬀects. See Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Eﬀect of Framing Actuarial 
Risk Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2011) 
(reporting that the majority of study participants deemed a twenty-six percent risk of violence 
to warrant civil commitment, but deemed civil commitment unwarranted if risk was ex-
pressed as a seventy-four percent chance of no violence). Lastly, and critically, criminal justice 
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Under an instrumentalist account, it is possible to make meaningful 
tradeoﬀs between these costs and beneﬁts. Thus, at some threshold of likelihood 
and severity, a possible future crime can justify preventive interference. The 
question here is whether this threshold is diﬀerent for defendants than for any-
one else—that is, whether the cost-beneﬁt calculus diﬀers for defendants and 
non-defendants who pose an equal risk. Because the risk is equal, restraining 
either group produces equal beneﬁt. The costs, however, might diverge. 
2. Diminished Costs 
There are three principal reasons that preventive restraint might seem less 
costly in the pretrial realm.264 First, pretrial restraint is structurally limited to the 
period between arrest and adjudication, which minimizes concerns about un-
controlled expansion. Second, deprivations of liberty might cost less to defend-
ants than to non-defendants. Third, arrest might provide a distinctively eﬃcient 
means of identifying dangerous people and imposing restraint. 
a. Bounded Restraint 
The ﬁrst diminished-cost argument is that pretrial restraint for dangerous-
ness is less costly because it is bounded in time.265 Preventive regimes tend to 
grow. Political incentives encourage institutional actors to expand the criteria for 
eligibility.266 Once a person is caught in the preventive net, moreover, there are 
o�en powerful incentives to continue restraint and none to end it. This concern 
is attenuated in the pretrial context, the argument goes, because any restraint 
imposed is structurally limited. It cannot begin without a criminal charge sup-
ported by probable cause; it must end with dismissal or adjudication. A preven-
tive regime outside the pretrial context could be designed with equivalent time 
limits, but, given the political liabilities of releasing a person who has already 
been designated as dangerous, enforcement of the limits would never be assured. 
The fact that the pretrial preventive restraint is structurally constricted makes it 
less alarming. 
 
system actors, like judges and prosecutors, may lack the resources or technical sophistication 
necessary to identify ﬂaws in predictive algorithms. 
264. There could well be more, but these three emerged as themes in the literature and through 
my own reﬂection and conversations with colleagues. 
265. Thanks to Richard Lippke for suggesting this point. 
266. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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Although the boundedness of pretrial preventive restraint is a point in its 
favor, it constitutes an extremely limited reduction in cost. Given the unpredict-
ability of pretrial proceedings, which can last months or even years, an explicitly 
time-bounded preventive regime not tied to the progress of a criminal case might 
actually provide greater protection against unnecessarily prolonged restraint. 
Regardless, the time-boundedness of pretrial restraint merely assuages one 
worry about a preventive regime. It does not diminish any of the actual harm 
that it inﬂicts. Finally, if a preventive regime for non-defendants did expand, 
such expansion would likely produce some additional beneﬁt in terms of crime 
prevention. Direct cost comparison to a pretrial regime would no longer be pos-
sible. Thus, what initially seems like a signiﬁcant cost diﬀerence between the 
restraint of defendants and equally dangerous non-defendants becomes, on re-
ﬂection, an uncertain diﬀerence at best. 
b. Less Cost in Liberty 
A second argument is that, given the likelihood of conviction, restraints on 
pretrial defendants are relatively less disruptive to the individuals restrained than 
they would otherwise be. In an o�-cited national dataset, approximately sixty-
six percent of felony defendants charged in state courts were eventually con-
victed and sentenced to a term of incarceration or probation.267 One might argue 
that this eventual incursion on liberty lessens the impact of pretrial restraint. 
This is a hard argument to assess. We have no satisfactory methodology for 
valuing liberty in the ﬁrst place, let alone valuing it on the eve of a criminal sen-
tence.268 It is possible that such incremental deprivations are indeed less costly. 
On the other hand, for the person whose liberty is dwindling, and for her family, 
her last weeks of freedom may have a comparatively greater subjective value. In 
the absence of a compelling case, there is no reason to assume that a person’s 
liberty is worth less just because she will soon have less of it. 
A variation on this argument is that pretrial restraint costs less because it can 
be credited against the eventual sentences of those convicted. That is, detention 
has no cost to the guilty. The deprivation of liberty is just borrowed from their 
future punishment.269 
The most obvious problem with this argument is its limited relevance: it ap-
plies only to those who receive a custodial sentence that is at least as long as the 
time they spent detained pretrial. Within that pool of defendants, moreover, the 
 
267. Reaves, supra note 3, at 22. 
268. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
269. See Laudan & Allen, supra note 240, at 34 n.32 (“The loss to guilty defendants is . . . typi-
cally . . . zero as time served pre-trial is accounted for in their sentence.”). 
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argument does not apply to people who receive a custodial sentence only as a 
result of being detained—that is, people who would not have received a custodial 
sentence if they had been released pretrial. For such people, the time spent in 
pretrial detention is not merely time they would have spent incarcerated anyway. 
Recent research (and anecdotal experience) suggests that this may be the case 
for a substantial percentage of misdemeanor defendants who serve custodial 
sentences.270 And most misdemeanor defendants do not serve custodial sen-
tences.271 For these reasons, the “credited-against-punishment” argument likely 
includes no more than a small fraction of those arrested on misdemeanor 
charges. 
Among felony defendants, the most recent national data show that approxi-
mately twenty-four percent were ultimately sentenced to prison.272 Given that 
felony cases represent only around a quarter of all criminal cases,273 the “cred-
ited-against-punishment” argument applies to around a quarter of a quarter of 
all defendants—or about six percent. 
Furthermore, the only pretrial restraint that is credited against punishment 
in current practice is full-scale detention.274 Time spent on pretrial supervision 
 
270. Using a large dataset from Harris County (including Houston, Texas), for example, Paul Hea-
ton, Megan Stevenson, and I recently found that approximately seventeen percent of the de-
tained misdemeanor defendants who pled guilty would not have been convicted at all had 
they been released rather than detained pretrial. Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 4, 
at 771. Many such people plead guilty in exchange for a “time served” sentence, which means 
immediate release. Id. at 715 n.15 and accompanying text, 771 n.162 and accompanying text. 
271. See, e.g., id. at 732-33 (noting that approximately ten percent of misdemeanor defendants in 
New York City and sixteen percent in Philadelphia receive a custodial sentence, though in 
Harris County the number is ﬁ�y-eight percent). 
272. Reaves, supra note 3, at 24 (66% of felony defendants in the 75 largest urban jurisdictions in 
2009 were convicted); id. at 29 (36% of those defendants—or 24% of the total—were sen-
tenced to prison). An additional 37% of those convicted were sentenced to jail, id., but these 
sentences likely reﬂect “time served” sentences that were the result of pretrial detention rather 
than the sentence these defendants would have received had they been released pretrial. See 
id. at 31 (reporting mean and median jail sentences of ﬁve and four months, respectively). 
273. To the author’s knowledge, there is no reliable national estimate of what percentage of U.S. 
criminal cases are felonies (versus misdemeanors), but the best available evidence—a 2010 
survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts—suggests that it is around a quar-
ter. See Robert C. LaFountain et al., Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 
State Court Caseloads, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 24 (2012), http://www.court 
statistics.org/other-pages/~/media/microsites/ﬁles/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx [http:// 
perma.cc/AF2X-GGV5] (reporting that misdemeanors represent more than three-quarters of 
state court caseloads in reporting states). 
274. See Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1147 (2013) (ex-
plaining that pretrial detainees “who are subsequently convicted usually have their sentences 
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or GPS monitoring is not generally deducted from the eventual sentence im-
posed.275 The “credited-against-punishment” argument therefore does not jus-
tify these lesser restraints. At best, then, this argument might justify pretrial de-
tention for approximately six percent of all defendants. 
There are additional problems with this best-case scenario. First, there is no 
foolproof way to know ahead of time which defendants will fall within the rele-
vant six percent. While discounting their pretrial liberty loss might reduce the 
costs of pretrial restraint in the aggregate ex post, it cannot justify the imposition 
of restraint in an individual case ex ante. More fundamentally, claiming that pre-
trial detention is costless because it counts as punishment is problematic. Pretrial 
restraint is only constitutional if it is not punishment. It is at least arguable that 
it must therefore be justiﬁable without equating it with punishment.276 
c. Notice and Opportunity 
The last diminished-cost argument is that arrest gives the state notice of dan-
gerous people and presents an immediate opportunity for intervention. It saves 
the costs of identifying dangerous people in the population at large (which we 
might term “search costs”) and taking them into custody (“arrest costs”). Recall 
that this argument also forms the basis for the idea that the state has a height-
ened duty to prevent pretrial crime.277 
 
shortened by the amount of time they spent in detention,” and citing statutory provisions that 
mandate such “credit for time served”). 
275. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3585 (2012) (providing that “[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the 
service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in oﬃcial detention prior to the 
date the sentence commences,” but providing no such credit for non-custodial pretrial re-
straint); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9760 (West 2017) (“Credit shall include credit for time 
spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of 
an appeal.”); Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]ime on 
probation does not qualify for credit.”); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 874 A.2d 12, 22 (Pa. 2005) 
(“[W]e hold that time spent subject to electronic monitoring at home is not time spent in 
‘custody’ for purposes of credit under Section 9760.”). 
276. The reality is that pretrial detention does currently function as pre-punishment. That should 
change. See Lippke, supra note 209, at 114 (suggesting criteria to ensure that detention is non-
punitive). We might even rethink the practice of crediting pretrial detention as “time served.” 
It fosters the illusion that pretrial detention has no cost in liberty, while reinforcing the im-
pression that pretrial detainees are guilty people getting a head start on their sentences. What 
if, instead, the state was required to compensate all pretrial detainees for their loss of liberty? 
See Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive 
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 814 (1996) (arguing that it would be “both fair 
and eﬃcient” to compensate preventive detainees); Jeﬀrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Frame-
work for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1953 (2005). 
277. See supra Section II.B.2. 
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The notice-and-opportunity argument has powerful appeal. It is indisputa-
ble that arrest can provide notice of risk and presents an immediate opportunity 
for restraint. Certain arrests may signal particular danger. And imposing any 
form of restraint on a dangerous person already in custody requires fewer re-
sources than restraining a person who has not yet been located or processed into 
the system. 
But the diﬀerence in search and arrest costs between defendants and non-
defendants who pose the same risk may not be as substantial as one might im-
agine. Big data will increasingly allow governments to identify high-risk mem-
bers of the general public with ease. And arrests, in the grand scheme of things, 
are not expensive. 
To begin with search costs: If it is not the case already, many U.S. jurisdic-
tions will soon have the capacity to identify non-defendants who pose precisely 
the same statistical risk as an average arrestee, or an average “high-risk” arrestee, 
with no more eﬀort than it takes to identify high-risk arrestees themselves.278 
Implementing pretrial risk assessment already requires statistical analysis of 
large administrative datasets. Jurisdictions could conduct the same analysis for 
non-defendants. The databases, moreover, are only getting bigger. Governments 
are integrating their data systems so that it is possible to analyze consolidated 
data relating to individuals’ employment, earnings, and past contacts with the 
DMV, criminal justice system, public housing and beneﬁts system, child welfare 
system, public hospitals, as well as mental health and addiction treatment sys-
tems—in short, all past contacts with a pervasive state.279 Given the scope of this 
data, predictive technologies could hypothetically enable fairly rigorous risk as-
sessment of the entire population, or of non-defendant subgroups, with targeted 
 
278. The average arrestee is not acutely dangerous. The only two recent published studies that have 
measured the rate of arrest for violent crime among bailees have documented rates of 1.8-
1.9%. Qudsia Siddiqi, Predicting the Likelihood of Pretrial Failure To Appear and/or Re-Arrest for 
a Violent Oﬀense Among New York City Defendants: An Analysis of the 2001 Dataset (Final Report), 
N.Y. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY (2009), http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/doc-view.php?module= 
reports&module_id=629&doc_name=doc [http://perma.cc/3B7Q-3V3F] (ﬁnding that, in a 
sample of 26,821 defendants released pretrial, the rate of rearrest for violent felony was 1.8% 
and the rate of rearrest for “violent oﬀense” including misdemeanors was 3.0%); Baradaran 
& McIntyre, supra note 11, at 527 (analyzing Bureau of Justice data on state-court felony cases). 
By “high-risk arrestee” I mean someone who would be classiﬁed as high risk by an existing 
pretrial risk assessment tool. 
279. See, e.g., Integrated Data Systems (IDS), ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE FOR SOC. POL’Y, http://
www.aisp.upenn.edu/integrated-data-systems [http://perma.cc/RSS5-CKZ5]. 
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interventions for those who score highest.280 This is already becoming a real-
ity.281 As governmental data management improves, any real cost diﬀerence be-
tween the identiﬁcation of statistically high-risk defendants and non-defendants 
who pose an equal risk will continue to collapse. 
One might argue that limiting risk assessment to arrestees nonetheless pro-
motes eﬃciency, because arrestees likely include a disproportionate number of 
dangerous people. That is, a pending criminal charge can function as a ﬁlter to 
facilitate eﬃcient risk proﬁling. In order to identify equally dangerous people in 
the population at large, by comparison, the state would have to build and analyze 
much larger datasets.282 Since these datasets will be built in any case, however, 
the relative eﬃciencies of each preventive system are likely to converge. Further-
more, using arrest as a proﬁling mechanism also has signiﬁcant downsides. The 
concentration of policing in poor and minority communities means that mem-
bers of such communities are arrested for drug and low-level crimes at rates dis-
proportionate to the share of crime they commit.283 Targeting this group for pre-
ventive restraint risks exacerbating these existing inequalities. In sum, using a 
 
280. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327, 331-32 (2015) (analyzing the interplay between big data and Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 878 (2016) (describing automated suspicion algo-
rithm technology and analyzing it under existing Fourth Amendment doctrine). 
281. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 280, at 385-86 (describing the use of predictive analytics to 
identify people at highest risk of committing or suﬀering gun violence in Chicago); Journal-
ism for Social Change, Pennsylvania County Leads in Use of Big Data To Stem Child Abuse, Probes 
Ethics First, CHRON. OF SOC. CHANGE (May 26, 2016), http://chronicleofsocialchange 
.org/news-2/pennsylvania-county-leads-globe-uses-big-data-stem-child-abuse-not 
-without-probing-ethics-ﬁrst [http://perma.cc/4228-EJNT] (describing a data initiative to 
identify children at highest risk of future abuse—and, implicitly, caregivers at  highest risk of 
committing abuse). 
282. The prospect of governments maintaining and analyzing comprehensive data dossiers on all 
of their citizens also raises privacy concerns and underlines the question of whether Fourth 
Amendment analysis should be diﬀerent for defendants versus non-defendants. Certainly, the 
needs of criminal prosecution itself justify some special intrusions into defendants’ privacy. If 
the intrusion is not necessitated by the prosecution, however, the standards for intrusion 
should not be more relaxed for defendants than for others. See supra Sections II.A and II.B. 
Thanks to Jessica Eaglin for raising this point. 
283. See, e.g., Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
55-61 (Aug. 10, 2016) http://www.civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2016
0810_DOJ%20BPD%20Report-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q89K-CL66] (documenting 
dramatic racial disparities in the Baltimore City Police Department’s arrest practices); Civil 
Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 4 (Mar. 4, 2015) 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04 
/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RRP-U86Q] (“Ferguson’s ap-
proach to law enforcement both reﬂects and reinforces racial bias.”); Frank McIntyre & Shima 
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pending criminal charge as a ﬁlter to identify dangerous people does not clearly 
produce net beneﬁts. 
The cost of arrest is a more obvious diﬀerence between the preventive re-
straint of defendants and the hypothetical equivalent restraint of non-defend-
ants. Arrest provides an immediate opportunity for intervention, because de-
fendants have already been subjected “to the physical dominion of the law.”284 
They need not be physically taken into custody for purposes of restraint for dan-
gerousness.285 
The question is how much this alters the cost-beneﬁt calculus. The answer 
depends, in turn, on how signiﬁcant this cost diﬀerential is relative to the total 
costs of the preventive regime. Although the answer will necessarily be specula-
tive, existing estimates of major relevant costs facilitate at least a rough assess-
ment. 
Suppose that the state wishes to detain ten people who each pose a ten per-
cent risk of committing an aggravated assault.286 According to the only recent 
eﬀort to quantify the full cost of detention (on the basis of a national dataset), 
the cost of detention for the felony pretrial period would be $40,300 for the av-
erage state defendant.287 Ten such detentions would cost $403,000. On the other 
side of the balance, the expected beneﬁt of the ten detentions is to prevent one 
 
Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Pretrial Detention, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 741, 759 (2013) 
(“Drug usage and sale rates among whites and blacks are o�en similar but systematically more 
blacks are arrested for drug possession and traﬃcking crimes than whites.”). 
284. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 n.1 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 
Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-389 (9th Cir. 1960)). 
285. Note, however, that if we start using non-custodial means to initiate more criminal proceed-
ings, this cost diﬀerential largely disappears. See Harmon, supra note 124 (suggesting that we 
should consider non-custodial options for a broader array of oﬀenses). 
286. Suppose this risk is calculated over the period of time equivalent to the average pretrial period 
for released defendants. 
287. Baughman, supra note 257, at 18. Baughman’s estimate admittedly excludes the component 
costs most diﬃcult to quantify. She relies, furthermore, on the single existing estimate of the 
value of defendants’ freedom (by Abrams & Rohlfs), which its authors acknowledge is likely 
to be an underestimate. Id. at 6 n.26, 18 ﬁg.2; see also Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 257, at 751 
(noting that, because their methodology relies on bail-posting behavior as revealing the price 
defendants place on their own freedom, defendants’ “credit constraints” may aﬀect their esti-
mate); David S. Abrams and David Rohlfs, Web Appendix for “Optimal Bail and the Value of 
Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment,” 3 (Aug. 2007), available under “Sup-
porting Information” at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00288
.x/abstract [http://perma.cc/B733-6S2V] (acknowledging that, because authors’ data “do not 
allow for identifying the eﬀects of credit constraints . . . our estimates may understate defend-
ants’ true valuations of freedom”); supra note 254 and accompanying text (describing the so-
cial costs of detention). 
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aggravated assault. A recent synthesis of prior research estimates the total aver-
age cost of an aggravated assault to be $119,812.288 
The cost of detention changes slightly if the ten detainees are non-defend-
ants, because the state ﬁrst has to locate them and take them into custody. These 
costs should amount to about as much as a simple arrest, which available esti-
mates price between $150 and $880.289 To err on the side of a greater cost diﬀer-
ential between defendants and non-defendants, we will posit that a preventive 
arrest would cost $900. Thus, the additional cost of arresting the non-defend-
ants would be $9,000, bringing the total cost of the ten detentions to $412,000. 
Given the scale of the total costs, the cost of arrest is not very signiﬁcant. The 
costs of detaining the ten non-defendants ($412,000) and the ten defendants 
($403,000) both substantially outweigh the beneﬁt ($119,812). There is a small 
margin where the $9,000 cost diﬀerential would tip the cost-beneﬁt calculus—
right around the degree of risk that makes the costs and beneﬁts equal. Deten-
tion is not cost-justiﬁed for the ten non-defendants unless they each pose at least 
a 34.39 percent risk. Detention is cost-justiﬁed at a negligibly smaller percentage 
of risk, 33.64 percent, for the ten defendants.290 The cost of arrest makes a dif-
ference for people who pose between a 33.64 percent and a 34.39 percent risk. In 
practice, these cost estimates are not suﬃciently precise to be sure that this is 
exactly the right range of impact. Even if it is, our risk assessment tools are not 
precise enough to reliably identify people who fall into it. 
 
288. In 2016 dollars ($107,020 in 2008 dollars, as reported by the authors). This includes tangible 
and intangible costs, to both the victim and society. Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of 
Crime to Society: New Crime-Speciﬁc Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 98, 98-99 (2010) (synthesizing prior research and updating cost esti-
mates for major crimes); see also Baughman, supra note 257, at 11 tbl.2 (reporting that cost 
estimates for assault range from $14,715-$158,250 in 2014 dollars, or $15,019-$161,126 in 2016 
dollars); Paul Heaton, Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell Us About 
Investing in Police, 5 tbl.1 (RAND Corp., Occasional Paper No. 279, 2010) (reporting that the 
average of three prior estimates of the cost of “serious assault” was $87,238 in 2007 dollars, or 
$101,415 in 2016 dollars). 
289. Harmon, supra note 124, at 319 (estimating the cost of arrest at $150 in oﬃcer time alone, i.e., 
excluding booking, transportation, or court costs); Christian Henrichson & Sarah Galgano, 
A Guide to Calculating Justice-System Marginal Costs, VERA INST. JUST. 19-20 (May 2013), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/a-guide-to-calcu-
lating-justice-system-marginal-costs-1/legacy_downloads/marginal-costs-guide.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/P9EZ-8GZ6] (reporting estimates that range from $165 to $880 for arrests 
for non-violent crime). 
290. To be cost-justiﬁed, detention that costs $412,000 must prevent 3.439 aggravated assaults; 
detention that costs $403,000 must prevent 3.364 aggravated assaults. For the detention of 
ten people to prevent 3.439 assaults, the ten must each present (on average) a 34.39% likeli-
hood of committing an assault; to prevent 3.364, they must each present a 33.64% likelihood. 
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This example suggests that, in an instrumentalist framework, the marginal 
cost diﬀerence between the equivalent restraint of defendants and non-defend-
ants will be relatively small. It will ﬂip the result of the cost-beneﬁt analysis for 
a very select group. The state may indeed have a heightened duty to restrain de-
fendants right on the borderline, and averting pretrial crime by this group may 
have particular beneﬁts.291 But few people will qualify, and we probably cannot 
tell who they are. 
The takeaway is that, although this cost diﬀerence is not meaningless, it does 
not constitute a categorical justiﬁcation for a regime of preventive restraint that 
we would never permit outside the pretrial context. For the vast majority of peo-
ple—defendants and non-defendants—the fact that it is marginally cheaper to 
restrain those who have already been arrested will not aﬀect the result of the cost-
beneﬁt analysis.292 In all but a few cases, this cost diﬀerential provides no justi-
ﬁcation for preventive restraint of defendants that we would not permit for 
equally dangerous members of the general public. 
Finally, even if the costs of preventive restraint are diminished in some ways 
pretrial, they are heightened in others. A growing body of rigorous empirical 
scholarship shows that pretrial detention causally increases the likelihood of con-
viction and a carceral sentence.293 The increase is due almost exclusively to an 
increase in guilty pleas. In other words, some number of defendants plead guilty 
only because they are detained. Furthermore, scholars speculate that this phe-
nomenon represents a signiﬁcant source of wrongful convictions.294 This special 
cost of preventive detention should be taken into account. 
 
291. See supra Section II.B.2. 
292. The less costly the restraint, the more of a diﬀerence it will make, and the greater the diﬀerence 
in minimum permissible risk thresholds will be. 
293. Five studies published in the last two years, deploying quasi-experimental design, have doc-
umented this eﬀect. Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 4; Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin 
& Crystal Yang, The Eﬀects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: 
Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
22511, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22511.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4KD-GTKZ]; Ar-
pit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence 
from Judge Randomization 22 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 531, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2774453 [http://perma.cc/2FGR 
-5WPB]; Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on 
Case Outcomes: Evidence from NYC Arraignments 34-35 (Nov. 9, 2016) (unpublished man-
uscript), http://home.uchicago.edu/~npope/pretrial_paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/GV7S-
H7GU]; Stevenson, supra note 4.  
294. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why 
We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 930-31 
(2008) (noting that “it is entirely possible that most wrongful convictions . . . are based on 
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In sum, while several costs of preventive detention might be diminished in 
the pretrial context, the diﬀerence is not as signiﬁcant as it might initially appear. 
This discussion is far from conclusive. But in the end, there is no clear evidence 
that the outcome of the cost-beneﬁt analysis for preventive restraint diﬀers for 
defendants versus non-defendants who pose equal risk. 
i i i .  parity of preventive authority 
Thus far, this Article has argued that, for purposes of preventive restraint, 
there is no clear constitutional, moral, or practical distinction between equally 
dangerous defendants and non-defendants. No doctrine holds that defendants 
have a diminished constitutional right against preventive interference. There is 
no clear moral basis authorizing greater preventive restraint of defendants. And 
the practical advantage of restraining a defendant versus an equally dangerous 
non-defendant is questionable at best. 
This conclusion provides the ﬁrst part of an answer to the question posed in 
the Introduction: what degree of risk justiﬁes pretrial restraint for dangerous-
ness? Since there is no basis to conclude otherwise, the answer should be “what-
ever degree of risk would justify equivalent restraint of a non-accused person.” If 
a defendant is no more dangerous than many non-defendants, and that level of 
risk would not authorize restraint of a non-defendant, it should not authorize 
restraint of the defendant either. This principle can be termed “parity of preven-
tive authority” or, for short, the “parity principle.” 
A. The Parity Principle in Action 
The parity principle does not itself prohibit preventive detention. Rather, its 
implications depend on whether there is some threshold of risk at which preven-
tive restraint of a non-accused person is permissible. If there is no such thresh-
old, then there is no justiﬁcation for preventive restraint of defendants either. 
But if there is a risk threshold at which pure preventive restraint is permissible, 
then pretrial preventive restraint is likewise permissible at that threshold of risk. 
1. What Risk Justiﬁes Pure Preventive Restraint? 
The question of whether pure preventive restraint is permissible for non-
defendants, and at what degree of risk, can be cast in either positive or normative 
 
negotiated guilty pleas to comparatively light charges” to avoid “prolonged pretrial deten-
tion”); Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2012) (“[E]very year 
the criminal system punishes thousands of petty oﬀenders who are not guilty.”). 
the yale law journal 127:490  2018 
558 
terms. The positive question is whether current law authorizes pure preventive 
restraint, and, if so, at what risk threshold. The normative question is whether 
the law should authorize such restraint and, if so, at what risk threshold. Both 
questions are complex. A comprehensive treatment of either is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Nonetheless, a brief discussion is useful. 
In positive terms, current U.S. law authorizes a wide array of purely preven-
tive restraint. Preventive detention regimes include, for example, the civil com-
mitment of sexually violent predators, immigration detention, the detention of 
suspected terrorists, and the involuntary commitment of pregnant drug users.295 
Short of detention, purely preventive restraints include temporary restraining 
orders, the No-Fly List, oﬀender registration regimes, peace bonds, and re-
strictions on professional licensure for people with past convictions.296 These re-
gimes reﬂect a judgment that it is permissible for the state to restrain responsible 
agents solely to prevent future crime. Many of these regimes have been highly 
controversial, but courts have stopped short of ﬁnding any wholly unconstitu-
tional.297 In positive terms, then, the parity principle permits pretrial preventive 
restraint at whatever degree of risk authorizes analogous restraint within these 
purely preventive regimes. 
Ascertaining where this risk threshold lies for any given restraint, however, 
is no easy matter. Current preventive law is extremely amorphous. The criteria 
for the No-Fly list are a mystery. Oﬀender registration statutes and categorical 
licensure bars simply presume dangerousness on the basis of past conviction. 
The dangerousness standards in civil commitment statutes vary widely by state, 
as do standards for the commitment of sexual predators.298 Most require some 
 
295. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Sex oﬀender commitment statutes condition com-
mitment on a “mental disorder” that renders a person substantially unable to refrain from 
harmful sexual behavior, but as commentators have noted, this conditioning is broad enough 
to reach most people at particularly high risk of committing serious crime. See Slobogin, supra 
note 37, at 123-26. 
296. See generally Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Non-Custodial 
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327 (2014) (exploring “terrorism-related ﬁnancial sanc-
tions, the No Fly List, and the array of residential, employment, and related restrictions im-
posed on sex oﬀenders”); Mayson, supra note 123 (examining the collateral consequences of 
criminal convictions as predictive risk regulations). 
297. Cf. Morse, supra note 209, at 1121 (commenting that proposals to replace criminal justice with 
a regime of pure prevention “are surely coherent and many would be constitutional”). 
298. See, e.g., Sara Gordon, The Danger Zone: How the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment 
Proceedings Harms People with Serious Mental Illness, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 657, 673 (2016) 
(“Because many state statutes do not deﬁne ‘danger,’ the statutes themselves put the burden 
on clinicians to substitute their own judgment for what a ﬁnding of dangerousness should 
encompass.” (citation omitted)); Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. 
L. REV. 855, 869-70 (2013) (“Notwithstanding three major United States Supreme Court 
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showing that the person to be committed is otherwise likely to cause harm to 
herself or others, but the deﬁnition of harm varies.299 No statute speciﬁes what 
numerical probability of a given harm in a given timespan warrants restraint. It 
is possible that a comprehensive survey of these ﬁelds might distill more robust 
common standards, but none are readily apparent. 
The more useful iteration of the risk-threshold question might be the nor-
mative one: What probability of what harm over what timespan should authorize 
a given restraint? Is a ﬁve percent likelihood of committing an assault over the 
course of three months a suﬃcient basis for GPS monitoring? For detention? 
How many people should we be willing to restrain for six months to prevent one 
armed robbery? 
Some jurists and scholars wholly reject pure preventive restraint, at least 
when it takes the form of full custodial detention. They believe that the detention 
of people who are responsible agents solely to prevent future intentional harm 
violates a fundamental tenet of any liberal legal order by treating restrained per-
sons as less than autonomous moral beings.300 To the extent that this is correct, 
purely preventive detention regimes should be eliminated. The parity principle 
would prohibit pretrial preventive detention as well. 
Others, including myself, hold that restraint of responsible agents, including 
detention, may be warranted to prevent future crime at some threshold of risk.301 
To the extent that this is true, the parity principle permits pretrial preventive 
restraint at that threshold as well. The remainder of this Article presumes that 
this is the case. 
The appropriate risk threshold for any given preventive restraint cannot be 
resolved here.302 But existing preventive laws do share a common emphasis on 
preventing bodily harm. Those statutes that oﬀer some speciﬁcity about what 
 
cases addressing the constitutionality of sex oﬀender commitment, the minimum probability 
of harm has not been squarely decided.”); id. at 871 (“State statutes and judicial opinions have 
set the probability of recidivism bar at diﬀerent heights.”). 
299. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 282 (2006) (not-
ing that some civil and criminal commitment statutes deﬁne “danger” to include a likelihood 
of property damage or emotional harm). 
300. See, e.g., Duﬀ, supra note 28; sources cited supra note 38. 
301. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 39. 
302. Cf. Stephen J. Morse, Neuroprediction: New Technology, Old Problems, 8 BIOETHICA F. 128, 128 
(2015) (“Deciding what rate and types of error are justiﬁable is a normative issue that can be 
resolved only by balancing the various interests implicated by the prediction, including the 
consequences to the subject and society and the cost of producing the prediction.”). 
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risk justiﬁes pretrial preventive detention invoke the risk of violent crime.303 In-
voluntary commitment laws tend to require a showing that the person to be 
committed is otherwise likely to cause physical harm.304 Quarantine is justiﬁed 
by the risk of physical harm (contagion), and restraints designed to prevent sex 
crimes and terrorism target particular genres of violence. It therefore seems rea-
sonable to propose that nothing less than a substantial likelihood of serious vio-
lent crime within a six-month span can justify onerous restraints on liberty.305 
The question of what counts as “substantial” remains. Is ﬁve, thirty, or sixty per-
cent enough?306 This is a debate that reformers ought to have, and it is possible 
that the answer will vary across jurisdictions. 
2. Policy Implications 
The policy implications of the parity principle depend on what degree of risk 
justiﬁes pure preventive restraint. Presuming that such restraint is sometimes 
permissible, but never on the basis of anything less than a substantial risk of 
serious violent harm in a six-month span, then pretrial restraint of defendants 
for general dangerousness is permissible if, and only if, the evidence supports 
that degree of risk. To implement this risk threshold, jurisdictions undertaking 
reform should take three practical steps. 
First, new statutes or policy guidance should specify that pretrial restraint 
for dangerousness is warranted only when a defendant presents a substantial risk 
 
303. See infra note 307. 
304. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 2017) (limiting involuntary commitment to a 
person who “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others”); State v. B.B., 
245 P.3d 697, 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (“To establish that a person is ‘dangerous to self,’ the 
state must present evidence that the person’s mental disorder would cause him or her to en-
gage in behavior that is likely to result in physical harm to himself or herself in the near term.” 
(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)).  
305. A six-month period is a popular time period for assessing pretrial risk, because it is, at once, 
short enough to make data collection and assessment feasible and long enough to accommo-
date the average pretrial period for released defendants in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., LJAF, 
Results, supra note 16 (evaluating the success of the risk assessment tool in its ﬁrst six months 
of use); Cohen & Reaves, supra note 82, at 7 (“Released defendants waited a median of 127 
days from time of arrest until adjudication . . . .”). One could argue that some property harms 
are more serious than some physical harm, such that the optimal risk standard would encom-
pass serious non-bodily harms as well. The problem is the diﬃculty of determining what con-
stitutes a suﬃciently serious non-bodily harm. 
306. Note that this kind of substantive risk standard is distinct from the standard of proof. See, 
e.g., Vars, supra note 298, at 872 (exploring the “relationship between standards of proof and 
recidivism risk thresholds”). 
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of serious violent crime in the pretrial phase, and there are no less restrictive al-
ternatives that would render the risk less than substantial. Ideally such laws 
would specify the numerical probability constituting a “substantial” risk. If 
agreement cannot be reached, the law could instead require any judge that ﬁnds 
there is a substantial risk to state what she believes the probability to be. Such 
transparency would promote debate and facilitate the organic development of a 
numerical deﬁnition in particular jurisdictions. 
Articulating this risk threshold would clarify current pretrial standards. Six 
of the nineteen state constitutional provisions that authorize preventive deten-
tion condition it on a risk of violence.307 But ten condition it on a vaguely artic-
ulated “danger” or the need to ensure “safety,” and three do not articulate a se-
verity-of-harm threshold at all.308 State statutory law varies tremendously, but 
rarely provides an explicit severity-of-harm threshold.309 The Bail Reform Act 
authorizes pretrial restraint to protect “the community” against any criminal ac-
tivity at all.310 As for the likelihood of harm, most laws mandate restraint if it is 
necessary to “adequately protect” or “reasonably assure” the safety of the com-
munity.311 These standards are too vague to provide practical guidance. 
 
307. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12(b) (“great bodily harm to others”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“physical 
harm to persons”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“a real and present threat to the physical safety of 
any person”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9 (“serious physical harm”); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 40 
(“substantial threat of physical violence”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8(2) (“serious bodily harm”); 
see also supra note 119. 
308. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22 (“a substantial danger” and need to protect the “safety” of other 
persons and the community); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19(1)(B) (“the public would be placed 
in signiﬁcant peril”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“an imminent danger”); MICH. CONST. art. I, 
§ 15 (“a danger”); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 29(3) (“a special danger”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32.2 
(“a danger”); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (need to protect the “safety” of other persons and the 
community); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (need to protect the “safety” of other persons and the 
community); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(C) (“a substantial danger”); see also N.M. CONST. 
art. II, § 13 (no danger threshold speciﬁcation); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9 (same); TEX. CONST. 
art. I, §§ 11, 11a (same). 
309. See Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 19, 27 (discussing the vagueness of “danger” deﬁnitions in 
state laws as of 1985); Gouldin, Disentangling, supra note 12, at 882-84. 
310. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 4-25 (1983); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Kelsey, 82 F. App’x 652, 654 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Mr. Kelsey has demonstrated an inability to 
stay away from drugs and drug-related activity, thereby making him a danger to society.”); 
United States v. Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985) (ﬁnding that “Congress intended to 
equate traﬃc in drugs with a danger to the community”). 
311. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22 (“reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the 
community”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“reasonably protect the community”); N.J. CONST. 
art. I, § 11 (“reasonably . . . protect the safety of any other person or the community”); OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 8 (“assure the safety of the community or any person”); PA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 14 (“reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community”); VT. CONST. II, § 40 
the yale law journal 127:490  2018 
562 
Second, pretrial risk assessment tools should aspire to measure and clearly 
communicate the probability that a defendant will commit serious violent crime 
before trial. This means that risk assessment tools should stop measuring crime 
risk in terms of the likelihood of arrest for anything. “Any arrest” is an overbroad 
proxy for harm. Some eleven million people are arrested each year; their charges 
range from unpaid traﬃc ﬁnes to murder.312 One-third of arrests lead to dismis-
sal or acquittal.313 And members of poor communities of color are dispropor-
tionately arrested for low-level crimes.314 Moreover, those at highest risk of re-
arrest are not the people at highest risk of rearrest for violent crime, and vice 
versa.315 If the goal is to avert violence, focusing on the likelihood of any future 
arrest targets the wrong individuals and fails to target the right ones. 
Pretrial risk assessment tools should instead measure crime risk in terms of 
the likelihood of rearrest for a serious violent crime in the pretrial phase. This 
measure does not avoid all diﬃculties. The harm is the actual commission of 
violent crime. Many people are wrongfully arrested, and many people who com-
mit violent crimes escape arrest. So, arrest for a serious violent crime is still both 
over- and under-inclusive as a proxy for the commission of violent crime itself. 
At the moment, however, it is the best measure available; conviction is thought 
to be too under-inclusive to be useful for these purposes.316 Classifying by like-
lihood of pretrial arrest for a violent crime is wholly possible, as a number of 
recent studies and risk assessment tools demonstrate.317 
Additionally, rather than make an implicit normative judgment that a given 
degree of risk is “low” or “high,” pretrial risk assessment tools should instead 
communicate the statistical likelihood that a particular defendant will be rear-
rested for violent crime in the pretrial phase. Although any validation study of a 
 
(“reasonably prevent the physical violence”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8(3) (adequately protect 
members of the community”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c) (West 2008) (“reasonably assure” 
safety). 
312. Minton & Zeng, supra note 2, at 1. 
313. Reaves, supra note 3, at 22. 
314. See supra note 283. 
315. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 11, at 528-29. 
316. This is my understanding on the basis of conversations with statisticians in the ﬁeld. 
317. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 11 (conducting statistical risk assessment on a national 
pretrial dataset and identifying groups most likely to be rearrested for violent crime during 
pretrial release); Berk et al., supra note 97 (describing a machine-learned algorithm developed 
to forecast rearrest for domestic violence); LJAF, Public Safety, supra note 88 (explaining risk 
factors and formula for PSA risk scales, including violence-risk scale). 
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tool that measures this outcome should produce this information, most instru-
ments do not emphasize or communicate it to decision-makers.318 A side beneﬁt 
of this approach may be that it is less stigmatizing to restrain someone on the 
basis of an eight percent chance of rearrest for violent crime than on the basis 
that she is “dangerous” or poses a “threat.” The former at least makes clear that 
the restraining authority thinks it highly unlikely that the person restrained will 
actually commit the feared harm. 
Third, jurisdictions should ensure that any intervention to mitigate future 
crime risk is the least restrictive means to render the risk less than substantial. If 
GPS monitoring reduces the risk below this threshold, for example, detention 
would not be justiﬁed. Any intervention, moreover, should be cost-justiﬁed at 
the margin, relative to alternatives.319 As Sonja Starr has noted in the post-con-
viction context, the real policy question is not “who’s riskiest?” but “what will 
most eﬀectively mitigate the risk?”320 
As of now, we know almost nothing about the elasticity of serious, violent 
pretrial crime to interventions short of detention. But this information will be 
critical to understand as pretrial reform advances. It is worth remembering, too, 
that not all risk-management techniques need be intrusive. Prediction is not in-
trusive per se, and it need not lead to restraint.321 The state might seek to respond 
to risk forecasts in a way that aﬃrms individuals’ agency, rather than disregards 
 
318. Rather, the primary metric oﬀered to demonstrate the accuracy of a risk assessment instru-
ment is the “area under the curve for the receiver operator characteristics” (AUC-ROC), a 
measure of classiﬁcation accuracy (success at correctly identifying instances of each outcome). 
See, e.g., Cadigan et al., supra note 96, at 7-8 & n.3 (analyzing the “predictive ability” of the 
federal PTRA in terms of the AUC-ROC and explaining the basis for using this measure); 
Mona J.E. Danner et al., Race and Gender Neutral Pretrial Risk Assessment, Release Recommen-
dations, and Supervision: VPRAI and PRAXIS Revised, LUMINOSITY, INC. 3 (Nov. 2016), 
http://luminosity-solutions.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Race-and-Gender 
-Neutral-Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-November-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/2KB6-C2CH] 
(calculating AUC-ROC for VPRAI and noting that AUC-ROC is “a common measure of risk 
assessment performance”). But for determining what intervention is appropriate for a given 
person or group, it is forecasting accuracy rather than the AUC-ROC that matters. 
319. This means that the prevention beneﬁt it provides relative to alternatives must outweigh its 
relative cost. Or, in more mathematical terms: If detention prevents 10% more crime than 
GPS monitoring, but costs 40% more, the question is not just whether the beneﬁt of detention 
outweighs its cost. Instead, the question is whether the incremental (10%) prevention beneﬁt 
outweighs the incremental (40%) increase in cost. 
320. Starr, supra note 19, at 855-62. 
321. See Morse, supra note 209, at 1125 (“The best hope for the future is that we discover preventive, 
nonintrusive techniques that will lower the risk of violent oﬀenses for everyone and nonintru-
sive interventions that will reduce the risk of recidivism for oﬀenders.”); Underwood, supra 
note 85, at 1424-26 (noting that the cost of prediction depends on the response to it). 
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it. A jurisdiction might oﬀer increased support and incentives to high-risk de-
fendants, for example, instead of supervision.322 Given that those most likely to 
commit future crimes may also be most likely to be future crime victims, a re-
sponse that addresses the needs of defendants rather than risk alone may have 
signiﬁcant advantages.323 
In sum, the parity principle extends the presumptive threshold for pure pre-
ventive restraint—nothing less than a substantial risk of serious violent crime in 
a six-month span—to defendants and non-defendants alike. Accordingly, juris-
dictions pursuing pretrial reform should (1) clarify that nothing less than a sub-
stantial risk of violence in the pretrial phase warrants restraint for general dan-
gerousness; (2) ensure that risk assessment tools measure and communicate the 
likelihood of rearrest for serious violent crime; and (3) evaluate potential inter-
ventions (not all of which need be restrictive) in terms of their eﬃcacy at reduc-
ing serious violent crime. These improvements in risk analysis and management 
are well within our grasp. 
3. A World with Parity 
What would a world governed by the parity principle look like? The most 
signiﬁcant change would be a heightening of the standards for pretrial preven-
tive restraint. Fewer defendants would be detained and supervised pretrial. It is 
possible, but unlikely, that the proposed framework could also encourage new 
preventive restraint outside the pretrial context. 
The parity principle would not authorize the state to sweep up large groups 
of people who are rendered statistically dangerous by circumstances beyond 
their control, like gender, race, poverty, and age. Those variables simply do not 
have adequate predictive power. The most powerful predictors of violent crime 
are past arrest and conviction for violent crime. Thus, only people with a record 
of past violence will meet the relevant risk thresholds. A recent arrest for vio-
lence, moreover, is more predictive than an old one. So, in practice, it may well 
be that the only people who meet the risk standard for detention are those who 
 
322. Richmond, California, for instance, operates a fellowship program for those at highest risk of 
killing or being killed; the program oﬀers intensive mentorship, guidance, and a ﬁnancial 
incentive for fellows to turn their lives around. See A.M. Wolf et al., Process Evaluation for the 
Oﬃce of Neighborhood Safety, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY (July 2015), 
http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publication_pdf/ons-process-evaluation.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7ASR-6TD]. 
323. See Richard Berk, The Role of Race in Forecasts of Violent Crime, 1 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 1, 3 
(2009). 
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have been credibly charged with a recent, serious crime.324 In that sense, the par-
ity principle does not foreclose a unique regime of preventive detention in the 
pretrial realm. But regardless, pretrial detention would meet the criteria of the 
parity principle: the state could justiﬁably detain equally dangerous non-defend-
ants if it knew of any. 
It might also be the case that, although both accused and non-accused people 
meet the relevant risk threshold, the state would elect to restrain defendants only. 
Pursuant to the parity principle, preventive restraint of a defendant is permissi-
ble if the state could justiﬁably impose the same restraint on an equally dangerous 
non-defendant. The parity principle does not require that the state actually treat 
both identically. It requires parity of preventive authority, not parity of preven-
tive treatment. 
A caveat is in order here. So far, I have assumed consensus not just on the 
parity principle, but also on the substantive judgment that nothing less than a 
substantial risk of serious violent harm can justify pure preventive restraint. As 
long as this is the baseline standard, the parity principle requires pretrial stand-
ards to level up to meet it. But if society decided that pure preventive restraint is 
justiﬁed at much lower levels of risk, the parity principle might have no eﬀect on 
pretrial practice. It might even authorize a leveling-down. It is also possible that 
the notion of “parity” might encourage governments to extend current pretrial 
restraint standards to non-defendants. These are real concerns. On the other 
hand, a risk standard that applies outside the pretrial context might be the best 
bulwark against unwarranted preventive restraint. The more universal the 
standard, the less likely it is to be distorted by the perception that the only people 
it aﬀects are an undeserving Other.325 
B. The Parity Principle as Benchmark 
This Article does not assert the parity principle conclusively. The argument 
in Part II is contestable at many points along the way. Even for skeptical readers, 
however, the parity principle can serve a useful analytical purpose. The ultimate 
question, with which this Article began, is what degree of crime risk justiﬁes 
pretrial restraint for dangerousness. The parity principle provides a helpful 
 
324. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 30, at 1239 (“[A] ﬁnding of probable guilt of a violent crime is the best 
possible evidence of future dangerousness . . . . [N]othing more clearly forebodes future 
criminal activity than the commission of a crime in the immediate past.”). 
325. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting that the Equal Protection Clause oﬀers powerful protection against oppressive laws 
by “requir[ing] the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what 
they impose on you and me”). 
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benchmark. To answer the ultimate question, the analysis can begin with what-
ever degree of risk—if any—would justify restraint of a non-accused person. 
Those who believe that there is good reason to diverge from this standard in the 
pretrial realm should bear the burden of articulating what distinction justiﬁes 
divergence, why it does, and how much divergence it warrants. 
Some readers, for example, might think this Article has understated the eﬃ-
ciency of leveraging the infrastructure of arrest and prosecution to operate a pre-
ventive regime. Such readers must consider, ﬁrst, whether preventive restraint 
can be justiﬁed on wholly instrumentalist grounds. If not, then a marginal dif-
ference in the instrumentalist calculus is irrelevant. If so, the question becomes 
how much the “true” cost diﬀerential alters the cost-beneﬁt calculus. Unless it 
ﬂips the outcome for a broad swath of people—which seems unlikely—it re-
mains the case that the state is justiﬁed in preventively restraining defendants 
only at or just below the risk threshold where we would authorize preventive 
restraint of a non-accused person. We should still, in this case, endeavor to de-
termine when pretrial restraint for dangerousness is justiﬁed by asking what de-
gree of risk would be suﬃcient to restrain a non-defendant. 
conclusion 
The third generation of bail reform has made tremendous strides in limiting 
money-bail practices that result in the systemic and unnecessary detention of the 
poor. Still, reformers would do well to keep in mind that the new risk-based 
model for pretrial policy is no panacea. A pretrial system centered on danger 
presents problems of its own. 
Most fundamentally, there is no clear constitutional, moral, or practical basis 
for subjecting defendants to preventive restraint that would be unjustiﬁed for 
equally high-risk members of the population at large. This means that we should 
think carefully about what degree of risk warrants purely preventive restraint: 
what likelihood of what outcome over what timespan?326 This is an extremely 
uncomfortable judgment to make. But it is necessitated by our new statistical 
methodology. The choice can be implicit or explicit, but it cannot be avoided. 
Presuming that we proceed on this instrumentalist footing, the reform 
model presents a further set of practical problems. Suppose we decide that a 
 
326. There is a compelling case that none does, although this Article has not made it. See, e.g., 
Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Conﬁnement of Convicted Per-
sons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 740 (1972) (“If a system of preventive incarceration is known sys-
tematically to generate mistaken conﬁnements, then it is unacceptable in absolute terms be-
cause it violates the obligation of society to do individual justice.”). 
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thirty percent chance of arrest for a serious violent crime in the next three 
months justiﬁes three months of detention. There is, ﬁrst, the problem of pre-
dictive power. None of the existing pretrial risk assessment tools can forecast 
with this degree of precision.327 Such precision may be attainable, but the tools 
are not there yet. Second, there is a racial equality problem. A recent ProPublica 
study sparked outrage by demonstrating that a prominent risk assessment tool 
produced much higher rates of “false” high-risk classiﬁcations for black defend-
ants than for white, and much higher rates of “false” low-risk classiﬁcations for 
white defendants than for black.328 Yet this is the inevitable result of any statis-
tical algorithm developed on the basis of a mixed-race population where there is 
a higher incidence of both the primary risk factors (past criminal justice con-
tacts) and the measured outcome (rearrest) among black defendants.329 Actuar-
ial risk assessment also presents thorny transparency problems and the possibil-
ity of perverse framing eﬀects. The degree to which we can mitigate these 
problems remains uncertain. 
The challenges of statistically informed policy do not mean that we should 
abandon actuarial forecasting altogether. Subjective risk assessment is no bet-
ter—and probably worse. To the extent that we authorize or require predictions 
of future harm, actuarial tools hold great promise. We should, however, proceed 
with caution. And caution should begin with clarity about the grounds of pre-
ventive intrusions. 
  
 
327. See supra Table 2 and accompanying discussion. 
328. Angwin et al., supra note 19. “False” is in quotation marks because no outcome can refute a 
mere risk classiﬁcation. 
329. There are ways to engineer the algorithm to avoid this result, but they raise separate problems. 
I explore these problems and possible solutions in a work in progress. Mayson, supra note 19. 
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appendix 
TABLE 3. 
PRETRIAL RAIS – RISK FACTORS330 
FL PRAI PTRA CPAT 
1. Age at admission;  
2. Current most serious 
charge;  
3. Is current charge 
907.041;  
4. Employment status at 
admission;  
5. Marital status;  
6. Have a telephone or cell 
phone;  
7. Time at current  
residence;  
8. History of substance 
abuse and/or mental 
health problems;  
9. Previous FTAs;  
10. Previous adult  
felonies;  
11. Previous adult  
misdemeanors 
1. # Felony convictions;  
2. Prior FTAs;  
3. Pending felonies or 
misdemeanors;  
4. Current offense type;  
5. Offense class;  
6. Age at interview;  
7. Highest education;  
8. Employment status;  
9. Residence;  
10. Current drug  
problems;  
11. Current alcohol  
problems;  
12. Citizenship status;  
13. Foreign ties 
1. Having a home or cell 
phone;  
2. Owning or renting one’s 
residence;  
3. Contributing to  
residential payments;  
4. Past or current  
problems with alcohol;  
5. Past or current mental 
health treatment;  
6. Age at first arrest;  
7. Past jail sentence;  
8. Past prison sentence;  
9. Having active  
warrants;  
10. Having other pending 
cases;  
11. Currently on  
supervision;  
12. History of revoked bond 
or supervision 
VPRAI ORAS/IRAS-PAT PSA 
1. Charge type (M/F);  
2. Pending charge(s);  
3. Criminal history;  
4. Two or more FTAs;  
5. Two or more violent 
convictions;  
6. Length of current  
residence less than one 
year/residence  
verified;  
7. Not employed two years 
or primary caregiver/ 
employed or primary 
caregiver;  
8. History of drug abuse 
1. Age at first arrest;  
2. # FTA warrants past 
24 months;  
3. Three or more prior jail 
incarcerations;  
4. Employed at time of 
arrest;  
5. Residential stability;  
6. Illegal drug use during 
past six months;  
7. Severe drug use  
problem 
1. Current violent offense;  
2. Pending charge at time of 
offense;  
3. Prior misdemeanor 
conviction;  
4. Prior felony conviction;  
5. Prior violent conviction;  
6. Prior FTA pretrial in past 
two years;  
7. Prior FTA pretrial older 
than two years;  
8. Prior sentence to 
incarceration;  
9. Age at current arrest 
 
 
330. See sources cited supra note 96. 
